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1 
Morality and the ‘Naturalness’ of transgenic 
animals 
 
 
Henk Verhoog 
          
 
 
Genetic Modification of Animals 
 
e speak about genetic modification when one or more genes 
(DNA-molecules with a certain function within the cell or 
organism) or combinations of DNA-molecules (so-called 
gene-constructs) are introduced into the animal involved.   
One method which is often used is that the DNA-molecules are injected 
with a very fine needle in the fertilized egg. We speak about transgenic 
animals when the genes come from a different species. This method may 
be used for different purposes: to increase production in animal 
husbandry, to make animals  resistant to diseases, or to change animals 
in such a way that they produce certain medically useful products in 
their milk. Once the genetically modified animals are developed they 
may also be multiplied by cloning techniques. 
 
Mice are used to a great extent nowadays in biomedical research to 
study the function of human genes, especially in connection with their 
role in human diseases. The animals are manipulated in order to use 
them as research models. For this purpose genes may also be ‘knocked 
out’, to see what happens or, when they are not functioning well, to 
replace them by other genes. The techniques of genetic modification are 
potentially very powerful techniques, especially if combined with other 
reproductive techniques such as in vitrofertilization, the freezing and 
transportation of embryos, embryo transplantation, etc.  Economic 
competition and the curiosity of the scientists drives this technique 
forward, and it is not surprising that many people are concerned about 
these developments. In the beginning of the so-called recombinant-DNA 
debate in the seventies, the emphasis was on safety issues (the safety of 
human beings). In connection with plants it is the deliberate release of 
genetically modified plants into the environment, and the ecological 
risks of doing so which attracts attention. When we come to animals and 
human beings the main concern is of an ethical nature.  
W 
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Ethical Aspects 
 
In the public discussion about genetic modification of animals in the 
Netherlands the concept of the 'intrinsic value' of animals plays an 
important role. According to many authors in the field of animal ethics 
only a particular class of sentient animals, with the capacity to suffer 
pain, have an intrinsic value. I have called this a zoocentric moral view 
on animals.1 In the zoocentric view a comparison is made with human 
beings, where the concept of intrinsic value has been in use for a long 
time. Certain human experiences (of freedom, or pleasure) are said to be 
of intrinsic value when this value can not be derived from any higher 
value. Similarly zoocentric ethicists argue that what sentient (vertebrate) 
animals and human beings have in common is that they can experience 
pleasure and pain in a more or less conscious way, and therefore 
animals have (experiences of) intrinsic value as well. This zoocentric 
view is a well established view, in the sense that in many countries laws 
for the protection of animals are based on it. In animal experimentation 
laws for instance, the main emphasis is on the prevention of the 
suffering of animals. 
 
Those who stick to this zoocentric view follow the same kind of 
reasoning with respect to the genetic modification of animals. Bernard 
Rollin is a good example.2 According to Rollin genetic engineering must 
be seen as a morally neutral tool. Morality comes in when the animals 
suffer as a result of genetic engineering. A consequence of this theory of 
animal ethics is that Rollin sees no moral problems with adapting 
animals to the system of intensive animal husbandry by means of 
genetic manipulation, for instance through the modification of an 
animal's instinctive needs or the reduction of stress. As long as the 
animal has a certain need, it may suffer when it cannot fulfil this need, 
but when we can take away the need through genetic engineering there 
will be no suffering. 
 
                                                          
1 H. Verhoog, ‘The concept of intrinsic value and transgenic animals.’ Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 5/2, (1992), pp.147-160.  
2 B.E. Rollin, ‘The Frankenstein thing: the moral impact of genetic engineering of 
agricultural animals on society and future science’, in Genetic Engineering of Animals. An 
Agricultural Perspective, eds. J.W. Evans and A. Hollaender (Plenum, New York, 1986), 
pp.285-297; B.E. Rollin, The Frankenstein syndrome. Ethical and social issues in the genetic 
engineering of animals (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995). (Editor’s note:  
See review in Animal Issues, 1/1, 1997.)  
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Many people feel an intuitive resistance to this view; they think that the 
housing system should be adapted to the needs or characteristic 'nature' 
of the animal and not the other way around. I argued against Rollin3  
that in order to determine whether animals are suffering, or that their 
wellbeing is disturbed, we usually refer to the animal’s species-specific 
needs. When we allow unrestricted manipulation of these needs, we 
might loose the only yardstick we have to determine whether the 
animal is suffering or not.  
 
A way to accommodate this intuitive resistance is to rethink the concept 
of intrinsic value. The original meaning is that an animal has a value of 
its own, independent of any instrumental value an animal may also 
have for man. To respect animals for their own sake, we have to 
transcend the utility relationship and emphasize their relative 
independence ('autonomy'), their species-specific nature and their 
integrity. In Rollin's view it is not the nature of the animal itself which 
matters, but the actually felt experiences related to the satisfaction or 
frustration of the needs involved in the having of such a nature. I hold 
that the characteristic nature itself, the species-specific characteristic 
way of being of an animal (its 'essence'), matters morally. To argue for 
this position one has to emphasize the role of the philosophy of nature 
in connection with (animal) ethics4. 
 
 
 
The Moral Relevance of ‘Naturalness’ 
 
In the present intellectual climate the very idea that the 'naturalness' of 
something has moral significance needs further clarification. To say that 
naturalness has moral significance suggests that we derive norms and 
values from nature, and this is seen by many people as an example of 
the so-called 'naturalistic fallacy'. In short, this fallacy says that the 
‘ought’ (what we ought to do) can not be derived from the ‘is’ (factual 
statements about reality, about nature). 
 
                                                          
3 H. Verhoog, ‘Ethics and genetic engineering of animals’ in Morality, Worldview and 
Law  eds. A. W. Mussjchenga et al (Van Gorcum, Assen), 1992, pp.267-278.  
4 In a recent analysis of the public debate about genetic engineering of animals, aiming 
at a research agenda of important ethical question, one of the questions which came 
out was: ‘What are the implications of the attitudes towards the naturalness and 
natural values for policy on the genetic modification of animals and the ethical 
weighing procedure required for that policy?’. J. Vorstenbosch and L. van Voorthuisen 
Ethiek, politiek en genetische modificatie van dieren (Netherlands Office of Technology 
Assessment, The Hague, 1992).  
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I would like to discuss this question of the naturalistic fallacy in the 
context of the meta-ethical question how we can know that a certain 
human action is morally good, how we can justify it. In philosophical 
ethics any appeal to a human or divine authority is not acceptable. It is 
said that the human moral agent should come to an autonomous, free 
judgement, and the reasons for coming to this judgement must be 
public. An appeal to one’s personal feelings or one’s intuition is not 
enough.  
 
A judgement can only be free when it is not forcefully imposed upon 
oneself. To morally legitimate one’s actions by appealing to nature or 
natural laws (‘it is good because it is in agreement with natural laws, or 
because it is natural’) is problematic because it overlooks the freedom of 
human beings. Our behaviour may, in a third-person perspective, be 
influenced by many ‘outside’ factors (genetic, physiological, social), but 
in a first-person perspective the experience of freedom is basic. On that 
basis we expect from people (not from animals) that they can account 
for their moral decisions; we hold them responsible for their choices. 
Holding people responsible for their behaviour would be senseless 
without the principle of freedom. When we say that people behave the 
way they do because it is encoded in their genes or ingrained in their 
brains, or because it is their ‘nature’ to act that way, this statement can 
be interpreted in two ways. In the third-person perspective it can be 
seen as a particular explanation of behaviour. When used in a first-
person perspective, as a moral justification of one’s behaviour (‘I had to 
do it, I had no choice because it is in my genes’), then  it is a case of a 
naturalistic fallacy. We also speak about biological or genetic 
determinism in this context. 
 
The meta-ethical reason why we cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, or 
values from facts, is not primarily a logical problem, but has to do with 
the difference between a first-person perspective based on our 
immediate experience and a third-person perspective in which human 
behaviour is described and/or explained from outside. A philosophical-
anthropological theory must include the idea of freedom and morality 
as one of the basic characteristics of the human species, of being human. 
A consequence for normative ethics is that what we ought to do (as 
opposed to what is) refers to something which is not yet there, an 
unrealized potential or goal, which might be realized in the future if we 
want it. Values are involved in all human behaviour. They are not 
derived from the facts of nature; they are signposts pointing into the 
future. 
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Normative valuation, pointing out what we ought to strive after,  
always involves both a human being as subject and an object which is 
valued. When the focus is on the human being,  the object valued is said 
to have an instrumental value. It is instrumental/contributive to the 
realisation of an intrinsic value of human beings. When, in valuation, 
the human being is focusing on the object for its own sake (because it 
has a good of its own), then the intrinsic value of the object is 
emphasized. The relation is non-instrumental in this case. 
 
The attribution of intrinsic value to an object is a free human decision in 
the sense that we are not in any way forced to make the attribution by 
our own nature. This also is the case when the object is a human being.  
That animals by (logical) necessity must have intrinsic value, or ought to 
be given intrinsic value because of certain facts about their nature, is not 
the case either. This does not mean that no reasons can be given why 
animals are appropriate objects of moral concern; I can try to make it 
plausible to someone who in the first instance does not believe it.  One 
reason could be the fact that we usually deal with domestic animals who 
are to a smaller or larger degree dependent on human beings. Looking 
at them from a (socio)-ecological perspective we might say that we have 
made them a part of the human community. When they suffer because 
of our treatment we are responsible for this. When talking about wild 
animals we might be impressed by their relative autonomy, by the 
evolutionary wisdom or (God’s) creativity expressed in the animal’s 
form and behaviour. Who are we in nature that we have the right to use 
animals for any purpose we like? The attribution of intrinsic value 
comes down to a human decision about which entities we want to bring 
into the moral domain. 
 
In the anthropocentric view non-human living entities are not included 
in the moral domain, and therefore their intrinsic value is not 
acknowledged. They only have an instrumental value. In the zoocentric 
view only those natural entities are included in the moral domain which 
have conscious experiences (sentient animals). In the biocentric view all 
living beings can have both instrumental and intrinsic value for human 
beings. 
  
When it is correct to say that attributing intrinsic value to animals or 
other organisms is a normative decision, then having intrinsic value is 
dependent on and inseparable from the act of moral valuation. It is only 
after the decision has been made that animals have a good-of-their-own, 
that the characteristic nature of the animal becomes morally relevant. 
When we take animals from the natural environment to which they are 
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adapted and bring them into a human environment, then it is our 
knowledge of the ‘nature’ of the animals which must guide us in finding 
out what the animals need for their well-being. On the basis of this 
knowledge certain standards or norms can be established for keeping 
animals. 
 
 
 
Cartesian dualism and ‘Naturalness’ 
 
Also important in our consideration of the relation between facts and 
values is the Cartesian dualism associated with modern natural science. 
Many of the confusions inherent in discussions about morality and 
nature are due to this Cartesian dualism between man, defined as 
'subject' (res cogitans) and nature, defined as 'object' (res extensa). 
Epistemologically we can say that the acquisition of knowledge by 
necessity presupposes a distinction between a knowing subject and an 
object to be known. In this distinction the object may be something we 
experience as being outside of us (a table, another person, a flower, etc.), 
but it may just as well be an inner experience which may become the 
object of our knowledge. This epistemological distinction, based upon 
our direct experience (first-person perspective) does not say anything 
about the nature of the object perceived. The problems with Cartesian 
dualism do not arise if interpreted in this epistemological sense. The 
problems crop up when it is interpreted as an ontological distinction 
between two completely distinct and unrelated worlds, res cogitans and 
res extensa.  
 
The ontological distinction is at the very basis of modern natural 
science, where nature is tacitly defined as res extensa, and where it is 
seen as the task of science to discover the 'objective' laws of nature, 
which are seen as totally independent of our 'subjective' (personal) 
experiences of the world. It is then, that the domain of values and the 
domain of facts become two completely separate domains. As subject, 
the human being stands outside nature. Rationality, self-consciousness 
and freedom are seen as characteristics of the human subject, and to 
attribute these qualities to nature, as res extensa, is considered to be 
anthropomorphism.  
 
Also moral valuation is seen as a typical characteristic of the subject, as 
'subjective'. Values are then seen as a product of the human mind; they 
are not found in nature as res extensa. It is believed to be the explicit 
task of natural science to discover the primary, objective qualities or 
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properties of nature. They are supposed to tell us what is 'real', 
independent of the world as it is experienced by the human subject. 
 
In such an ontologically interpreted dualistic framework it becomes 
logically impossible to derive values from facts, ought from is. Notice 
that 'facts' and 'is' do not refer to nature as directly experienced by man, 
as part of his life-world, but to the impoverished nature of res extensa, 
devoid of any subjective qualities. This is what Kass5 refers to when he 
says that 'our natural science is, quite deliberately, most 'unnatural'. The 
gap between nature studied scientifically and life lived naturally is seen 
by him as the result of the deliberate choice of modernscience for 
'objectivity'. 
 
In his book 'The phenomenon of life' Jonas6  says: 
 
The contention -almost axiomatic in the modern climate of 
thought- that something like an "ought" can issue only 
from man and is alien to everything outside him, is more 
than a descriptive statement: it is part of a metaphysical 
position which has never given full account of itself. 
 
If the Cartesian dualism underlying modern science is a 'deliberate 
choice', not being itself the result of our understanding of the world, but 
an assumption which defines a particular way of looking at the world, 
then the question arises whether we could make a different choice. Jonas 
looked for what he called a reunion between the subjective and the 
objective. He believed that the realisation of such a reunion could only 
be effected from the objective end, through a revision of the idea of 
'nature', postulating a continuity, rather than a duality between mind 
and nature. In the dualistic view ethics belongs to the subjective side, 
without any objective foundation. When a continuity between mind and 
nature is postulated, ethics could be conceived as part of the philosophy 
of nature, grounded in 'an objective assignment of the nature of things'. 
 
In the tradition of Whitehead, Jonas, like several other 'organicist 
philosophers',7 refuses to interpret the world as a purely material 
mechanism, driven forward by efficient causes, devoid of any 
subjectivity, mind or inwardness. In Jonas's philosophy of nature man's 
                                                          
5 L.R. Kass, Toward a more natural science. Biology and Human Affairs (The Free Press, 
New York, 1985), Preface, p.ix. 
6 H. Jonas, The phenomenon of life (Harper and Row, New York, 1966), p.283. 
7 We can think here of the work of several European continental scientists-
philosophers, such as Goethe, Portmann, Buytendijk, Viktor von Weizsacker, Plessner 
and others. Some of these are introduced by Marjorie Grene in Approaches to a 
philosophical biology, (Basic Books, New York, 1968).  
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subjectivity has become a part of nature; it is no longer alien to nature, 
as it is when nature is interpreted as res extensa.  
 
What is appearing in man's consciousness, thoughts about nature for 
instance, can now be seen as far less estranged from nature than in the 
Cartesian dualistic view. The epistemological point that thoughts about 
nature arise in human consciousness and depend on our own activity, 
can not be denied however. What is denied is that the 'content' of these 
thoughts necessarily comes from man only and not from what is going 
on in nature. The same could be true with respect to values, and in 
particular with the intrinsic value of animals. When you look at an 
animal as a Cartesian object in an anthropocentric context, you may not 
be able to discover its intrinsic value. You have to see the animal in a 
more phenomenological way as a being with subject-character as well, 
with whom we can communicate (we may call this a second-person 
perspective). As they sometimes say in environmental ethics: by really 
participating in nature in a deep-ecological way, natural entities can 
become partners of whom we learn that they have a good of their own. 
By learning this and by listening to what they have to tell us, respect for 
them arises in a self-evident way.  
 
 
 
The Role of Philosophies of Nature 
 
We have come to the conclusion that in a biocentric view the 
characteristic ‘nature’ of the animals involved has become a morally 
relevant category. We have also seen that one’s philosophy of nature 
affects one’s view of the relation between facts and values. The role of 
philosophies of nature also comes to the fore in another way. Some 
biologists might argue that speaking about the characteristic or essential 
nature of an organism refers to an outdated, typological way of looking 
at animal species. And, when it is not possible to define what is 
specifically ‘good’ for the animal, does not also the concept of intrinsic 
value become implausible? As an illustration I would like to refer to an 
article by Mauron,8 in which he criticizes the view put forward by 
Jeremy Rifkin that ‘the crossing of species borders and the incorporation 
of genetic traits from one species directly into the germ-line of another 
species represents a fundamental assault on the principle of species 
integrity and violates the right of every species to exist as a separate, 
                                                          
8 Alex Mauron, ‘Ethics and the ordinary molecular biologist’ in Scientists and their 
responsbility  eds. W.R. Shea and B. Sitter (Watson Publishing International, Canton, 
1989), pp.249-265.  
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identifiable creature’.  Mauron points out that speaking about species as 
separate, identifiable entities is 'essentialistic language', which is 
incompatible with the anti-essentialist philosophical outlook immanent 
in much of current biology after the Darwinian revolution. In this 
philosophical outlook the emphasis is on competition between 
individual organisms within populations. 
 
To most biologists, Mauron says, the new technical opportunities to mix 
genetic material from different sources, is a natural extension of the way 
these biologists are trained to think about individuals, genomes and 
species. Given the anti-essentialist philosophical outlook the 
development of genetic engineering can be seen as a ‘logical 
development’. To assume that there are inviolable species barriers he 
considers to be wishful thinking; as humans we may want to establish 
such barriers for ethical reasons, say between man and other animals, 
but we cannot 'read' such barriers in the state of nature. To do so would 
imply the use of an arbitrary concept of ‘naturality’. Mauron reaches the 
following conclusion: 
 
All this points to a form of naturalistic fallacy that often 
muddles the discussion of genetic engineering and many 
other issues concerning the impact of science on society. I 
do not think that the "naturality" of an action has any 
bearing on its ethical standing. Of course, many things that 
are done under the guise of "respecting nature" are 
valuable and well worth doing. Why not acknowledge 
that they are so for man-centered reasons (improving his 
safety or quality of life)?9 
 
I think that Mauron's reasoning is based on a number of doubtful 
assumptions. First of all, to speak about 'species integrity' or to show 
respect for the integrity of a species or the species-specific 
characteristics,  one need not necessarily believe in discontinuity or 
constancy of types, which is considered by Mauron to be characteristic 
of essentialism. The evolutionist Gould,10 who cannot possibly be called 
an 'essentialist', speaks about the integrity of animal species because of 
their long evolutionary history. That the characteristics of species can 
change over time is not the morally relevant point; also individual 
organisms such as human beings, change over time, but this does not 
affect their integrity. The point is that the constitutive characteristics of a 
species are not just accidental ones, chosen by man to categorize a class 
of more or less similar animals; the point is that they are the result of a 
                                                          
9 Ibid., p.255. 
10 S.J. Gould, An urchin in the storm (Penguin, London, 1990). 
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long evolutionary process, which has led to a more or less harmoniously 
balanced whole, in close relation with a particular environment. With 
such a species-concept in mind, the interference with modern techniques 
of genetic modification, thereby creating 'trans-genic' animals, might be 
seen as an assault on the integrity of a species. The existence of species 
barriers (no exchange of genetic material)  between most species of 
animals is an empirical fact, which has little to do with the idea that 
species change over time.  
 
The question now is, whether the existence of these empirical barriers 
has any moral relevance for human behaviour with respect to these 
animals. Mauron says that we may want to establish these barriers for 
ethical reasons (thereby making them 'inviolable'), but we cannot 'read' 
such barriers in the state of nature. 
  
The last quotation clearly shows that Mauron holds an anthropocentric 
view of nature. Within this view it is true by necessity that something 
can only be valued by human beings for man-centred reasons. That all 
valuation is a human activity does not imply that the content of the 
valuation does  only depend on a specific interest we as humans have in 
the outcome of the valuation. In a zoocentric and biocentric view it is 
possible for humans to value something for its own sake. 
 
Finally I would like to say a few words about Mauron's interpretation of 
the naturalistic fallacy. He says: 'I do not think that the "naturality" of an 
action has any bearing on its ethical standing'. In connection with the 
topic under discussion this is a very confusing statement. Rifkin did not 
say that it is ‘unnatural’ to cross species barriers, and therefore we are 
not allowed to do it. I am not sure what his reasons are for accepting the 
principle of species integrity. He may have had philosophical or 
religious reasons, but whatever the reasons, a naturalistic fallacy need 
not be implied. In a non-anthropocentric normative theory for 
establishing the moral quality of human behaviour with respect to 
animals or nature, the principle of naturality plays a very important 
role. Out of respect for the intrinsic value of an animal we ought to treat 
animals, as much as possible, in such a way that we do not infringe 
upon their species-specific characteristics; we should take into account 
their 'characteristic nature'.  In a biocentric view we are not talking 
about the naturality of 'human action', but about the role in human 
action of the nature of the object of human action. 
 
Interesting in Mauron’s article is the acknowledgment of the anti-
essentialist philosophical outlook immanent in much of current (neo-
 
   
 
11 
darwinian) biology. This does not mean, however, that essentialist 
outlooks are totally lacking in modern biology. One example to the 
contrary is Brian Goodwin, who is generally seen as a representative of 
a structuralist approach within biology. Structuralism has been 
portrayed by Resnik11 as the rebirth of ‘rational morphology’, a kind of 
typological thinking which dominated biology in the pre-darwinian 
period. Goodwin12 himself has described the conflict between 
structuralism and neo-darwinism as a conflict between typological 
thinking, which sees reality in an underlying nature/kind/type, and 
population thinking, according to which the type is a human 
abstraction, only the variation between the individuals is real. 
 
Because of Goodwin’s structuralist philosophy of nature he is critical of 
many aspects of genetically engineering plants and animals. In his paper 
‘Species as natural kinds that express distinctive natures’13 he again 
contrasts his approach with the neo-darwinistic one, according to which 
species have arisen by historical contingency, through random genetic 
variation and selection of the fitter variants. In Goodwin’s structuralist 
approach species acquire a status that they do not have in Darwinism, 
as natural kinds with distinctive natures. Such a view, he says, invites a 
relationship to organisms that recognises their intrinsic qualities, so that 
they are valued for their beings rather than simply for their utility.  
 
In Goodwin’s book ‘How the leopard changed its spots’14 he says: ‘An 
organism or a work of art expresses a nature and a quality that has 
intrinsic value and meaning, with no purpose other than its own self-
expression’. Goodwin pleads for the need of a science of qualities, as 
complementary to the traditional natural science of quantities. 
  
For Goodwin it does not seem to be any problem to relate his 
structuralist realist philosophy of biology with the idea of intrinsic 
value.  We can conclude that a biocentric normative theory seems to be 
more plausible for a biologist adhering to a more holistic  philosophy of 
nature, whereas the molecular biologist Mauron uses a nominalist 
                                                          
11 David Resnik, ‘The rebirth of rational morphology: a process structuralism’s 
philosophy of biology’, Acta Biotheoretica 42, (1994), pp.1-14.  
  
12 G. Webster and B.C. Goodwin, ‘The origin of species: a structuralist approach’, 
Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 5, (1982), pp.15-47.  
13 Brian Goodwin, ‘Species as natural kinds that express distinctive natures: the case for 
a moratorium on deliberate release’ in Coping with deliberate release. The limits of risk 
assessment, ed. A van Dommelen (International Centre for Human and Public Affairs, 
Tilburg, 1996), pp.73-78.  
14 B.C. Goodwin, How the leopard changed its spots. The evolution of complexity (Scribner’s 
Sons, New York, 1994), Chapter 7.  
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philosophy to legitimate his anthropocentric normative theory. This 
brings me to the last part of my paper. 
 
 
 
The ‘Unnaturalness’ of Modern Science 
 
Let us return to Kass' statement that natural science is quite deliberately 
most 'unnatural'. Kass pleads for a more ‘natural’ science, that is closer 
to our immediate experience, whereas Wolpert15 holds that ‘natural’ 
thinking, by which he means day-to-day common sense thinking, will 
never give an understanding about the nature of things. Doing science 
requires one to remove oneself from one’s personal experience, and he 
mentions molecular biology to illustrate this. For Wolpert there is no 
room for Kass’ more natural science or for Goodwin’s science of 
qualities; it is science or nothing. 
 
In contrast to Wolpert I think that within biology as a whole we have 
scientific disciplines which are closer to our everyday experience of 
nature and disciplines which are far away from it. When we enter a 
modern scientific laboratory we discover very little of the 'nature' as we 
experience it in our everyday life. 
  
Biologists and historians of biology are well aware of the tension which 
exists, since the nineteenth century in particular, between the naturalists 
and the experimentalists.16   It looks as if, on the eve of the coming 'age 
of biotechnology' this tension is intensifying. There seems to be an 
increasing gap between the study of nature as directly given in our life-
world and a 'second nature' made in the laboratory. Transgenic 
creatures first have to be 'made' before they can be studied. 
  
To understand the ethical questions which have arisen in discussions 
about the genetic engineering of animals it looks as if we have to pay 
much more attention to the processes of transformation which take 
place when nature as given becomes the object of experimental science. 
This question has not received much attention in the philosophy of 
science. It is only recently that sociologists of science and some 
                                                          
15 Lewis Wolpert, The unnatural nature of science (Faber and Faber, London, 1993).  
16 Dobhansky speaks about the distinction between Cartesian and Darwinian aspects of 
biology. It is sometimes expressed as the distinction between restricted sciences, 
dealing with closed systems (usually in the laboratory) and unrestricted sciences, 
dealing with open systems. Mertz and McCauley (Synthese 43/1, 1980) analyze the 
differences between laboratory ecology and field ecology; field ecologists speaking 
about the ‘unreality of laboratory research’.  
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philosophers of science have started to pay attention to the role of the 
experiment in creating a 'second nature', which is sometimes far 
removed from the 'first nature' of our direct experience. 
 
 I would like to give one example which illustrates this development. 
Michael Lynch17 describes the transformation in experimental biology of 
the 'naturalistic animal', the animal as we know it in our daily 
experience, into the 'analytic animal' as object of natural science. He 
describes how laboratory procedures assure the removal of the 
characteristics which make up the naturalistic animal; the result is an 
artefact. In the laboratory, phenomena are created and perpetuated, 
which could never have arisen in nature. 
 
Could it be that molecular biologists such as Mauron can not accept the 
moral relevance of the concept of naturality, because they are no longer 
dealing with given nature, because their work has become totally 
'unnatural'? If reductionistic experimental molecular biology is 
constructing a second nature in the laboratory, then the 'objective facts' 
of the molecular biologist can be seen as the final result of a process of 
transformation of nature, taking place in the laboratory. In experimental 
science 'objectivity' is more and more loosing the meaning it has for the 
naturalist (describing and explaining nature as directly given in our 
experience); objectivity is defined as reproducibility of results and in 
biology this can usually only be obtained under laboratory conditions. 
Reproducibility is a necessary condition for the application of 
knowledge in technology. 
 
This view upon science goes very much against the view of 
positivistically inclined scientists such as Wolpert, who believe that the 
science which abstracts from our direct experience of nature is 
describing nature as it 'really' is (primary qualities), the 'objective facts', 
totally devoid of any subjectivity. According to more relativistic 
philosophers and sociologists of science, these facts of the laboratory 
must be seen as products (constructs) of human thinking and 
experimentation. Facts are not simply given in experimental science, 
they are always the result of specific interpretations of what is 
perceived.  
 
According to such a non-positivistic analysis there are good reasons to 
believe that the experimentally transformed second nature of the 
molecular biologist is not value-free. It may not just be describing nature 
                                                          
17 M.E. Lynch, ‘Sacrifice and the transformation of the animal body into a scientific 
object’, Social Studies of Science, 18, (1988). 
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'objectively' ('true' to the object), but transforming it on the basis of a 
very specific design. The experimental design in biotechnology is based 
on a specific anthropocentric attitude towards nature: interfering in 
nature in order to gain control over nature. We could even say that the 
nominalistic concept of nature of some of the more extreme defenders of 
relativism provides a perfect legitimation for genetically engineering 
nature. If nature is no more than a human construct, then there is 
nothing in nature itself preventing us from reconstructing it, nothing of 
intrinsic value, withholding us from disturbing the integrity of either 
individual organisms or, indirectly, of the species to which they belong. 
And ultimately, why should we refrain from the patenting of transgenic 
organisms when such organisms are seen as human inventions, as 
artefacts, which did not exist before the interference of the genetic 
engineer? Arnim von Gleich18 gives a good characterisation of the 
classical ideal of the 'hard' sciences, versus that of the 'soft' sciences. 
Hard sciences are reductionistic, experimental sciences, characterised by 
various forms of abstraction, quantification etc. and aiming at 
intervention in and control over nature. Very different are the ideals of 
the 'soft' sciences, which stay much closer to the life-world as 
experienced by man. The mechanistic concept of nature is replaced here 
by an organismic one; methodical reductionism is replaced by a holistic 
approach and experimentation is taken as a dialogue with nature, and 
not as a subordination of nature. 'Soft' for von Gleich does not have the 
negative inclination it usually has within the community of natural 
scientists.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In experimental reductionistic science we see a progressive 
transformation of given nature, as directly experienced in our life-
world, to a second or more or less artificial nature. In this process the 
qualitative aspects of nature, which are so evident in our life-world, are 
lost sight of. The more science is impregnated with instrumental values, 
the more difficult it becomes to see the intrinsic value of nature. There is 
an inbuilt tension between the very process of objectifying nature, 
demanded by the ontological interpretation of Cartesian dualism, and 
the idea that animals (or nature) have intrinsic value. The realm of 
values and the realm of knowledge get divorced from each other. 
 
                                                          
18 Armin von Gleich, Der wissenschaftliche Umgang mit der Natur. (Campus Verlag, 
Frankfurt, 1989).   
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The word 'intrinsic' is closely related to the word 'essence' or 'essential', 
the characteristic nature of something. The anti-essentialism of modern 
(molecular) biology may be needed for greater control over the 
processes of life but, in a time of increasing alienation from nature and 
environmental catastrophes, it always has to be balanced by more 
holistic approaches. The moral relevance of 'naturality' can more easily  
be experienced in our direct sensorial contact with nature. With the 
more phenomenological method of von Gleich's soft science, or 
Goodwin’s science of qualities, we can deepen this experience. The 
'qualitative' knowledge which results from the application of this 
method is very much needed for the evaluation of modern 
biotechnology, and to redress the exaggerated claims of molecular 
biologists, of which Mauron is only one example. 
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Is there a problem in attributing beliefs and 
intentionality to animals? 
 
 
Anne Quain 
 
 
 
 
n Dr Seuss’s story, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’1 the protagonist2 
confronts a pair of levitating green trousers in a dark wood at night. 
In spite of the fact that this is a rather strange situation in which to 
find oneself, and that this other being is completely unknown to her, 
our heroine - I shall henceforth refer to her as Everyperson - 
immediately reacts as if these pants were behaving in accordance with 
some sort of purpose or intention. This is evident in her account of the 
situation: 
 
I wasn’t scared. But, yet, I stopped. 
What could those pants be there for? 
What could a pair of pants at night 
Be standing in the air for?3  
 
Although this account seems absurd because it takes the novelty of the 
situation for granted, what Everyperson is doing is something which 
most of us have engaged in at some time in our lives: interpreting the 
behaviour of another being as if that being possessed beliefs and 
intentions. In other words, Everyperson adopts what is sometimes 
called the ‘Intentional Stance’4 towards the pants (which shall be known 
henceforth as GP - short for Green Pants). As Dr Seuss’s tale unfolds, 
Everyperson is able to determine, to what degree of precision it remains 
unclear, the intentions of GP through acts of communication - most 
importantly, verbal language. Everyperson and GP thereby become 
                                                          
1 Dr. Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’ in The Sneetches and Other Stories (William Collins 
Sons & Co, London, 1961).  
2 Although the protagonist is a hare-like creature (i.e. a non-human animal), Seuss 
expects us to unproblematically identify with her as an intentional being. For the 
purposes of this article, I will adopt the intentional stance toward this protagonist.  
3 Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’ - original emphasis 
4 This phrase was made famous by Daniel Dennett in his book of the same name, in 
1987. I will discuss the intentional stance in more detail in Part I of this article. 
I 
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friendly acquaintances and engage with each other without further 
problems. 
In real life, such a situation would not be so clear cut. Philosophers and 
scientists alike have realised that there are many problems in attributing 
beliefs and intentions to other beings. For instance, even if we allow that 
Everyperson’s initial judgement had been confirmed by the end of the 
tale, most of us would agree that her immediate attribution of 
intentionality to the pants was an intuitive reaction, based on little direct 
evidence of the presence of beliefs or intentions. 
 
At this point we might ask, ‘Well then, what is intentionality? and 
where do beliefs and desires fit into this picture?’ My task in Part I of 
this article is to answer these questions. I will show that the common 
assumptions regarding intentionality tend to lead to more stringent 
conditions for intentionality in relation to non-human animals than to 
humans. The impact of such a double-standard on our perception of 
non-human animal intentionality has been enormous. However, I will 
leave the question of whether or not this is a tenable position aside for 
the greater part of this article, and focus on the alleged problems of 
attributing beliefs and intentions to all non-human animals, as this has 
been the main focus of the current philosophical debate about 
intentionality. 
 
I will discuss the nature of intentionality as it is attributed to non-
human animals in Part II, along with the assumptions inherent in our 
views of what constitutes evidence for such. This leads to a discussion of 
the issue of anthropomorphism in Part III. 
 
In Part IV I will discuss the main issues pertaining to language as an 
indication that a being is intentional. I will examine arguments such as 
those of Regan and Stich, in which the issue of anthropocentrism, in 
relation to the language debate, is highlighted. 
 
In Part V I will discuss a popular alternative to the intentional stance - 
animal behaviourism - which appears to have been adopted by 
cognitive ethologists everywhere. Just as it was shown to be a very 
narrow and problematic approach to human psychology some decades 
ago, I will argue that behaviourism is equally inapplicable to non-
human animals. 
 
I will relate the issue of attributing beliefs and intentions to non-human 
animals to the important ethical issues which are at stake in the question 
of non-human intentionality in Part VI. 
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In conclusion, I will re-evaluate Everyperson’s position in the light of 
this discussion. My own intention is to show that those problems in 
attributing beliefs and intentions to non-human animals, and indeed 
other unclassified beings such as GP, which cannot be avoided through 
exercising caution, are not enough to justify dismissing the intentional 
stance. 
 
 
 
Part I 
 
The intentional stance is the strategy of interpreting 
 the behaviour of an entity (person, animal, 
 artefact, whatever) by treating it as if it were a 
 rational agent who governed its “choice” of “action” 
 by a “consideration” of its “beliefs” and “desires”. 5 
 
Adopting the intentional stance towards a given being entails assuming 
that the behaviour of this being can be explained and understood in 
terms of its beliefs, desires and intentions, that is, what it thinks and feels. 
An example of an intentional explanation would therefore be: ‘the cat is 
scratching on the kitchen cupboard because he thinks the cat food is in 
there’. Copeland contrasts intentional explanations, which refer to mind 
states, with explanations which refer to brain states, such as 
‘explanations of behaviour that are couched directly in terms of 
electrical activity in the agent’s cortex’.6 Intentional explanations, then, 
focus on the content of the mind - primarily, beliefs and desires - which 
are assumed to play some sort of causal role in relation to the behaviour 
of living beings. In order to explain this role, it is important to say a 
word about beliefs and desires themselves. 
 
Beliefs and desires are intentional because they are ‘about’ something - 
they exist in virtue of the fact that they have some sort of 
representational content. Thus, I do not just have beliefs - I have a belief 
that my friend is downstairs, or a desire to see my friend. We can therefore 
say that beliefs and desires exhibit intentionality because they are 
extensive. When we adopt the intentional stance, we assume that 
behaviour is motivated by the interaction between a desire and one or 
more congruent beliefs. Thus my behaviour of going downstairs and 
saying hello to my friend Taliessin could be said to be indicative of my 
                                                          
5 D.C. Dennett, Kinds of Minds (Phoenix, London, 1996), p.35.  
6 B.J. Copeland, Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction (Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1993), p.56.  
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belief that Taliessin is downstairs, coupled with my desire to see her. 
Similarly, an intentional explanation of the behaviour of a polar bear 
might be that ‘the bear is pounding on the ice above the den of a seal 
because it has the belief that a seal is under the ice, and the desire to eat 
that seal’. We derive the animal’s intentions from its (apparent) beliefs 
and desires.  
 
Such conclusions regarding intentions are likely to be based on the 
premise that the being in question, whether human or not, is aware of 
what it is doing and why: that it is conscious. Consciousness, like beliefs, 
is intentional, and thus one must be conscious of something.  
 
Some philosophers (such as Dennett7 and Carruthers8) have argued that 
an additional type of belief exists, without which an intentional being 
cannot be said to be conscious. This is known as a ‘second-order belief’, 
which is simply a belief that I believe such and such..9 To be conscious, 
argue these philosophers, a being must apply the belief that it has beliefs 
to its beliefs of everything else, otherwise the consciousness has no 
object. Second-order beliefs are much more abstract entities than 
‘ordinary’ beliefs, and they are less likely to be manifested in behaviour 
other than verbal. It is impossible to say whether or not non-human 
animals possess such beliefs at all. Carruthers and others emphatically 
deny such beliefs to non-human animals without being able to prove or 
disprove such claims.  
 
It is ultimately the issue of consciousness of non-human animals that is 
at stake in the various debates about intentionality, and which has thus 
rendered the attribution of intentionality to non-human animals 
problematic. But besides these controversial issues, the intentional 
stance itself, as a ‘strategy of interpreting behaviour’,10 is not above 
criticism. 
 
 
 
Part II 
 
One of the major problems in attributing intentionality to non-human 
animals is the nature of the intentional stance which most of us tend to 
                                                          
7 Dennett, ‘Kinds of Minds’ 
8 P. Carruthers, The Animals Issue (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992) 
9 This explanation of second-order belief is paraphrased from Carruthers, ‘The Animals 
Issue’, p.178.  
10 Dennett, ‘Kinds of Minds’, p.35.  
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adopt. As Dennett has pointed out on numerous occasions, inherent in 
this stance is the assumption that the being towards which we adopt 
this stance is a rational being, whose beliefs and desires are accurately 
reflected in, and 
verifiable through observation of, their behaviour.11  
 
There are a considerable number of problems with such a stance. The 
first is that the assumption of rationality is based on a secondary 
assumption that the being in question will always reason to act in favour 
of its own best interests, and thus that he/she knows what these are. This 
is quite a stringent condition to apply to non-human animals, because 
we cannot even say this of human beings, particularly young children or 
the mentally ill. There is a tendency to fail to allow for the possibility 
that non-human animals can, at times, be irrational - just like humans. 
This attitude is obvious in David Attenborough’s explanation of polar 
bear behaviour in the documentary Polar Bear.12 Two young bears 
engage in what appears to be aggressive behaviour, without doing 
serious physical harm to one another. Attenborough explains that that 
the polar bears are engaging in play fighting to prepare for their lives as 
adult male bears, as if the bears desire to be strong adult bears, and believe 
that ‘play-fighting’ will make them so. This explanation overlooks other 
possibilities, such as  the possibility that the bears may be engaging in 
this activity for no other reason than that they enjoy doing so. 
 
The reason for this oversight is that the assumption of rationality 
usually leads to plausible explanations.  Should we  fail to take 
rationality as a starting point, it would be an almost impossible task to 
predict the most likely course of action of an intentional being. The 
problem is that when non-rational or irrational behaviour appears 
rational from an external point of view, the explanation which is 
derived may fit the situation whilst simultaneously failing to reflect the 
beliefs and desires behind the action.13  
 
Alternatively, we may mistake the ‘rational’ behaviour of animals for 
irrational behaviour. Dennett gives the following example of a frog 
which swallows a baited fishing line: 
 
                                                          
11 See especially D.C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1987). 
12 D. Attenborough, Polar Bear , Produced by Martha Holmes and Keith Schole for BBC 
Worldwide, Ltd., Sydney: ABC Video.  
13 We are not freed from this dilemma automatically if we assume rationality whilst 
granting that we are sometimes wrong in this assumption, for we have to be able to 
recognise situations in which the agent is not or has not been rational. This brings us 
back to our original question of interpretation. 
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The frog has made a mistake, but exactly which 
 mistake(s) has it made? What did the frog “think” 
 it was grabbing? A fly? Airborne food? A moving 
 dark convexity? We language users can draw 
 indefinitely fine distinctions of content from the 
 candidate frog-thought.14  
 
Adopting the intentional stance, we therefore run the risk of grossly 
misinterpreting the behaviour of non-human animals, and with it 
attributing imprecise or incorrect beliefs and intentions. This error can 
occur in varied cases. In Dennett's example, it occurs due to the 
imprecision with which we ascribe particular intentions to a non-human 
animal. Error may also occur in relation to the degree of precision with 
which we isolate a behaviour which warrants an interpretation. 
 
Thus another problem with adopting the intentional stance is that we 
tend to apply the intentional stance to the whole of the non-human 
animal's behaviour, assuming a rational explanation for all of it. This 
approach allows no room for the errors which non-human animals 
make, such as choosing an impractical location to build a nest, or 
wandering off and being unable to find a way back to a community or 
colony. We simply explain these as if the animals behaviour is an 
accurate reflection of its belief-desire, and that we are interpreting it 
correctly. 
 
In fact, in the case of non-human animals, the only way we measure the 
‘truth’ of an intentional account is against the standard of rationality: if 
the explanation is reasonable and fits the picture, it is very likely to be 
taken as an accurate and adequate explanation. This is problematic 
because, as I have shown in this section, a rational explanation may not 
give an accurate account of the beliefs and desires held by non-human 
animals. Moreover, many rational explanations are available for the one 
behaviour: there is no foolproof way of deciding which of these is the 
appropriate explanation. 
 
 
 
 
Part III 
 
Here we expose the underlying anthropomorphism 
of the intentional stance: we treat all intentional 
systems as if they were just like us - which of course 
                                                          
14 Dennett, ‘Kinds of Minds’, p.51. 
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they are not.15  
 
Fortunately for GP, GP’s beliefs and desires were of such a nature that 
Everyperson’s interpretive strategies culminated in a more-or-less 
accurate view (once corrected) of what GP’s behaviour was really 
signalling. Everyperson simply based her interpretation on the 
assumption that GP was just like herself. 
 
Anthropomorphism is a problem which arises because the intentional 
stance is a strategy for interpreting behaviour, and is necessarily applied 
from a point of view. Thus the attribution of intentionality is subject to 
the limits of the interpreter. Nagel illustrates this view in his essay, 
‘What is it like to be a bat?,’ in which he argues that ‘the subjective 
character of experience...is not analysable in terms of any explanatory 
system of functional states, or intentional states’.16 He emphasises the 
fact that there are elements of subjective experience which are 
inaccessible to observers. The implication is that these elements may 
constitute data which are fed back into the mind, undetectably 
influencing behaviour. Thus we can have a case where, in what we 
perceive to be the exact same set of circumstances and environment, an 
immeasurable qualitative difference may cause a being to interpret the 
context in a different way. 
 
Nagel’s essay is typically assumed to be a polemic against 
anthropomorphism. Nagel does indeed argue against the practice of 
assuming that we can know everything about the experience of another 
creature (and therefore whether or not to attribute beliefs and intentions 
to a particular creature). But if we take Nagel’s argument in the 
strongest sense,17 the implication is that human experience is so 
different to the experience of non-human animals that we cannot 
possibly gather the evidence required to attribute intentions and beliefs 
to them. If we accept this conclusion, there is no reason to attribute 
beliefs and intentions to non-human animals in the first place, as even if 
we did, their beliefs and intentions may be so different to those which 
we understand that we are no closer to understanding non-human 
animals than we were in the first place. In other words, Nagel’s stance 
                                                          
15 Ibid., p.43. 
16 T. Nagel, ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ in The Mind’s I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self 
and Soul, composed and arranged by D.R. Hofstadter and D.C.Dennett (Penguin, 
Hammondsworth, 1981).  
17 As for instance Dennett has done. See Kinds of Minds in particular for such an 
interpretation of Nagel’s argument.  
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can lead to an anthropocentric18 position in regard to beliefs and 
intentions. 
 
If we reject anthropomorphism altogether, this may lead to the attitude 
that not only does it render an interpretation of non-human animal 
behaviour unscientific, but that the fruits of an interpretation tainted 
with this bias are wrong. This can lead to the situation which Dennett 
describes in Kinds of Minds: 
 
So where we recognise that much of what we 
think of the awfulness of pain...involves 
imagining...anthropomorphic accompaniments, 
we generously decide that they are just  
accompaniments, not “essential” to the brute 
phenomenon of sentience.19   
 
Dennett’s remark brings to our attention the fact that the conclusion that 
anthropomorphic interpretations are wrong does not follow from the 
premise that such interpretations can be incorrect or inaccurate. We must 
be careful not to jump to conclusions in either direction if we are really 
to be faithful to a scientific approach. We should not dismiss the fact 
that ‘anthropomorphic interpretations’ often appear to explain the beliefs 
and intentions of non-human animal behaviour adequately, and 
certainly allow us to predict their behaviour much of the time. 
 
Furthermore, if we hold that humans evolved from a non-human 
ancestry, we must accept that we will be similar to non-human animals 
in a number of determined as well as a number of as yet undetermined 
ways. Apparently ‘anthropomorphic’ explanations may be closer to the 
truth than some would argue. To dismiss them would therefore be a 
mistake. As Dennett states of the issue: 
 
What we may tend to overlook...is the possibility 
that we are subtracting, on one path, the very 
thing we are seeking [ie. the correct explanation 
of non-human animal behaviour] on the other.20  
                                                          
18 Such a stance is said to be anthropocentric (as opposed to anthropomorphic) because 
it preferences the human perspective and experience over any other perspective or 
experience, namely that of non-human animals. In this case, the implication of the 
anthropocentric viewpoint is that only what humans have experienced as a belief or 
intention can be recognised as such. If the experience of a non-human animal is so alien 
to us that we cannot discern its beliefs or intentions, the anthropocentric philosopher (if 
one will permit what I see to be a gross contradiction in terms) will conclude that the 
animal in question is not an intentional being as all. They do so because they are 
looking for a distinctly human type of belief or intention.  
19 Dennett, ‘Kinds of Minds’, p.128.  
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As for anthropocentrism, this is a problem which needs to be overcome 
even by those championing the existence of consciousness in non-
human animals. A case in point is Tom Regan’s discussion, in which he 
effectively divides animals into two distinct and mutually exclusive 
groups21: humans and non-human animals.22  This approach is useful to 
some extent, but it tends to render invisible or even insignificant the 
differences between animal species in relation to the intentionality 
debate. It may well be that some animals have beliefs and intentions, 
whilst others do not. Such a possibility is denied in Regan’s sweeping 
statement that ‘even if primates show that they are able to use a 
language [and thereby show that they have beliefs and intentions], they 
would prove to be the exception rather than the rule’.23 This quotation 
illustrates the dangers of  the anthropocentric tendency to group a large 
variety of animals together when it comes to intentionality. It leads to an 
‘all-or-nothing’ stance, embodied in the view that all animals (except for 
humans, which are noticeably absent from this group) have beliefs or 
intentions, or none of them do. 
 
If we are to attribute beliefs and intentions to non-human animals, we 
must avoid an anthropocentric stance. However, we must not confuse 
anthropocentrism with anthropomorphism. To dismiss 
anthropomorphism completely may be (to borrow a phrase from Stitch), 
‘to throw out the baby with the bathwater’.24  Ideally, we need to tread 
the very fine line between the insights which emerge from the so-called 
‘anthropomorphic’ approach on one hand, and the biases of 
anthropocentrism on the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
Part IV 
 
And now, we meet quite often, 
Those empty pants and I, 
And we never shake or tremble 
                                                                                                                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 This division is usually taken for granted as fact in the intentionality debate, as is 
reflected in the approach to this very article.  
22 See especially T. Regan, The Case For Animal Rights (University of California Press, 
Los Angeles, 1983), pp.66-7. 
23 Ibid., p.39. 
24 S. Stitch, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1983), p.4.  
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We both smile  
And we say 
“Hi!”25  
 
At the end of Dr Seuss’s tale, GP and Everyperson establish verbal 
communication, being fortunate enough to both use language, and the 
same language at that. Language is a medium we use to establish 
whether or not beliefs and intentions can be attributed to another being. 
If I say ‘I am going to put the cat outside because I think he wants to go 
to the toilet’, (assuming we are in the same language community), you 
can make sense of my behaviour immediately, and you might then 
hesitate to bring the cat back inside immediately, even if you desire to. If 
you are not sure about what beliefs and intentions are behind my 
behaviour, you can simply ask me and I can give a detailed verbal 
response. 
 
Of course, I can always lie to you. Or it may be the case that I am unable 
to articulate something, or even that what I do say is misinterpreted. But 
by and large, we can say that it is very likely that a human being uses 
language to express a desire or an intention, even if to deceive. From this 
we can infer that a person who uses language is an intentional being.26  
 
In this account, I have presented language as a medium for the 
articulation of pre-established beliefs and desires. These may still be 
present if language is not - it is simply more difficult to ascertain their 
presence in this case. However, some philosophers and scientists have 
argued that language facilitates the construction of beliefs and desires, 
and without it, no being can be said to be intentional at all.27  
 
Even when we take for granted the assumption inherent in this 
argument, that non-human animals do not use language, the argument 
remains problematic. Firstly, such an argument assumes that language 
precedes beliefs and intentions. If this is the case we cannot explain how 
human babies, as non-linguistic beings, make the transition to 
linguistically proficient beings, because we cannot argue that these 
babies learn by believing that words resemble particular concepts.28  But 
we DO know that young children  learn language, and that before doing 
                                                          
25 Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of’? 
26 I will leave out a discussion of the philosophical creature, the Zombie, who exists for 
the purpose of undermining this conclusion. I feel that Dennett deals with Zombies 
very well in Consciousness Explained, 1991.  
27 See D. Davidson, ‘Rational Animals’ Dialectics, 36/4 (1982) and Stitch, ‘From Folk 
Psychology to Cognitive Science’ for arguments of this type.  
28 This point is also made in Regan, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, p.44. 
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so, must rely on a selection of non-verbal behaviour (such as crying at 
the sight of a dog; laughing, smiling and waving one’s arms about when 
mum opens the refrigerator etc) in order to express beliefs and desires. 
Experience teaches us that beliefs and language must be distinct in order 
for the former to precede the latter. 
 
Secondly, by arguing that language is a necessary condition for 
intentionality, we risk identifying particular linguistic constructions 
with certain beliefs. An example of such a position is given by R.G. Frey, 
as discussed by Regan: 
 
According to Frey, animals lack beliefs because 
what is believed (the object of belief) is that a given sentence is 
true; and since animals lack 
linguistic proficiency, they cannot believe that 
any sentence is true. That being so, they cannot 
believe anything and so, given that beliefs are 
necessary for desires, they cannot desire anything.29  
 
The type of argument put forward by Frey and others leads to 
‘paradoxes of intentionality’,30  which occur when belief tokens are 
confused with belief types, or vice-versa. According to Frey’s logic, Fido 
the dog cannot be said to believe that the cat is up tree X, unless he 
believes ‘Lambie [or the name or some other representation of the cat in 
question] is up tree X’, or something almost word-for-word similar. 
 
Such an argument seems preposterously strong: it not only excludes 
non-human animals, but also non-English speaking humans, young 
children and anyone else who is unable, for whatever reason, to 
formulate such a sentence. If we admit that these beings can believe 
something is true without possessing the token or sentence for that 
belief, then we must allow that possessing a particular belief-token 
cannot be a necessary criterion for having a belief. Regan extends this 
objection to argue that if a belief-type cannot be reduced to a belief-
token, it makes no sense to claim that belief is constituted by a token.31  
 
Philosophers such as Davidson, Stitch and Frey, in holding that 
language is an essential criterion in attributing intentionality to other 
beings, seem to overestimate the role played by language in moulding 
beliefs. But language and beliefs are different things. This is evident at 
                                                          
29 Ibid., p.39.  
30 This phrase is one of Copeland’s. For further discussion, see Copeland, ‘Artificial 
Intelligence’, pp.199-200. 
31 See Regan, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, p.41.  
 
 
 28 
times when we are aware that language is inadequate for our purposes, 
and we must communicate our beliefs and desires as best we can. It is 
also evident at other times, we find that expressing a belief or desire 
verbally can clarify it for us.32  The tension between language on the one 
hand and our beliefs, desires and intentions on the other supports the 
notion that these are separate and distinct faculties, even if they do 
usually function interdependently. 
 
Those who adopt the position that language is necessary for 
intentionality often assume that non-human animals do not have 
language. Such an assumption discounts the possibility of non-verbal 
communication, which, although not as complex as a verbal language, 
indicates the presence of beliefs and desires. If the argument about 
language is based on the premise that human language is the only way 
we can ascertain the presence of second-order beliefs (assuming, for the 
moment, that these are a necessary condition for intentionality), it does 
not follow that a lack of verbal language signifies a definite lack in 
second-order beliefs.33  
 
Another objection to this argument is the controversial point that 
several studies have shown the ability of non-human animals to use 
human languages such as sign language.34 These studies and others like 
them consistently undermine the assumption that language is an 
exclusively human faculty. If it is through language that second-order 
beliefs emerge, we must, in the light of these experiments, acknowledge 
that second-order beliefs can be attributed, at least to the non-human 
animals who have so far successfully demonstrated some degree of 
linguistic competence. 
 
The subject of non-human animal communication is one which is highly 
controversial, partly because there is no clear-cut method of 
distinguishing those instances of animal behaviour which constitute an 
act of communication from those which are not intended to 
communicate anything. This is another difficulty arising from the 
human position.  
 
                                                          
32 Dennett draws attention to this matter in The Intentional Stance: ‘Language enables us 
to formulate highly specific desires, but it also forces us on occasion to commit 
ourselves to desires altogether more stringent in their conditions of satisfaction than 
anything we would otherwise have any reason to endeavour to satisfy’.(p.20).  
33 See Part 1. 
34 An exposition of such studies is beyond the scope of this article. See for instrance the 
work of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, or discussion in The Great Ape Project, ed. P. Singer 
and P. Caveleiri (Fourth Estate Publishers, London, 1993). 
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It is perhaps for this reason that the major studies pertaining to non-
human animal communication have all been based on the view that an 
animal has language if it has the ability to adopt human language. The 
view that non-human animals may have a language limited to their 
species does not seem to constitute, in the eyes of scientists, sufficient 
evidence that they use language.35  
 
However, one can object that basing judgements about the linguistic 
faculty of non-human animals on their ability to use human language is 
a very anthropocentric view. As with the arguments about rationality, 
this ‘language’ criterion seems to demand much more for non-human 
animals36 than it does for humans as  subjects of a similar situation. 
 
 
 
 
Part V 
 
But then a strange thing happened. 
Why, those pants began to cry! 
Those pants began to tremble. 
They were just as scared as I!37  
 
The above stanza captures Everyperson’s act of applying the intentional 
stance perfectly. She observes GP’s behaviour, assumes that GP must be 
similar to her, and infers beliefs and intentions from GP’s behaviour 
based on this similarity. Of course, the interpretation that GP is scared is 
made after Everyperson’s previous - and incorrect - interpretation 
resulting in the conclusion that GP’s beliefs and desires are malignant.38  
 
                                                          
35 For example, see Regan, ‘The Case For Animal Rights’.  
36 In Savage-Rumbaugh’s work, Bonobo Chimpanzees are expected not only to learn a 
language, but to communicate in a variety of ways which they are not used to (such as 
communicating via an electronic keypad). We expect the Bonobos to learn new 
behaviours as well as an entirely new language. On the human scale, this would be like 
asking of human subjects that they learn and adopt the principles of echolocation using 
squeals instead of words. While such an experiment can teach us a lot about the way 
human beings learn, it does not necessarily lend decisive insight into our linguistic 
abilities.  
37 Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’ 
38 One can argue that Everyperson is still justified in applying the intentional stance, as 
she was correct in assuming that GP was trying to run to her. It may in fact be the 
precision of Everyperson’s judgements that are the grounds for the errors: Everyperson 
expects too much of the intentional stance, just as Dennett shows we expect to know 
too much about the intentions of a Frog in order to judge whether it is being rational or 
not. (See Part II).  
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A possible solution to the problem of ascribing beliefs and intentions to 
non-human animals which avoids the pitfalls of adopting the intentional 
stance is simple: do not attribute beliefs and intentions at all. In spite of 
the fact that such a view is counter-intuitive, it has been taken up by 
many scientists as if it were an established truth. This dogmatism, as 
Griffin39 terms it, is widely known as ‘behaviourism’. Though 
outmoded in relation to humans, ‘the behaviouristic viewpoint has been 
accepted, implicitly, if not explicitly, by most ethologists studying 
animal behaviour’.40  
 
The behaviourist doctrine, in relation to animals, holds that the 
intentional explanations of non-human animal behaviour are human 
constructions which have no basis in fact whatsoever; instead, all 
behaviour is in response to ‘independent variables’ or environmental 
stimuli only (including the chemical and neural environment of the 
brain and body).41 Thus behaviourists attempt to account for animal 
behaviour in terms of environmental histories and/or chemical analysis 
of brain states. 
 
A problem with the behaviourist position is that it is very limited 
because it requires the study of complex behavioural histories. Heyes 
and Dickinson adopt a behaviourist approach in experiments designed 
to determine the presence of animal beliefs. They emphasise the impact 
of the environment on animal behaviour, as can be seen in the following 
passage: 
 
Our analysis suggests that in order to find out 
whether any given example of animal action is 
intentional it is essential to measure the effects on 
that action of changes in the animal’s environment 
which could be expected to alter the content of  
the animal’s mental states .42  
 
I have emphasised what I believe to be the key element of this passage, 
which highlights the interpretive function of behaviourism. This 
passage thus allows us to see that the criticism that adopting the 
intentional stance is based on mere interpretation and speculation can also 
be leveled at behaviourists. 
                                                          
39 See D. Griffin, Animal Thinking (Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1984), pp.18-24.  
40 Ibid., p.19.  
41 In explaining the doctrine of behaviourism I have made use of the entry on the 
aforementioned from The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995, p.67. 
42 C. Heyes and A. Dickinson, ‘The Intentionality of Animal Action’, Mind & Language, 
5/1, (1990), p.94 - emphasis added. 
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In predicting animal behaviour, the intentional stance has the advantage 
over behaviourism: the former is quicker and less complicated than the 
latter. Furthermore, the behaviourist, without recourse to a mind, runs 
into problems when trying to  explain the faculty of memory in non-
human animals, or prima facie random behaviour. Overall,  assuming 
beliefs and intentions in animals seems to ‘fit’ the picture altogether 
better than behaviourism, which Griffin rejects outright, ‘not so much 
because it belittles the value of living animals, but because it leads to a 
seriously incomplete and hence misleading picture of reality’.43  
 
It has been argued by others that the intentional stance cannot be 
discarded in favour of behaviourism, because the latter is simply a 
redescription strategy, which attempts to draw the same conclusions as 
would be drawn from the intentional stance, by simply employing a 
more dense vocabulary. Routley makes this point, arguing that 
 
each new redescription, obtained for instance by 
iteration of “something like”, is in turn intentional, 
and requires itself elimination - not to say 
explanation (unless “something like...something 
like belief” collapses back to the problematic 
“something like belief”).44  
 
The point is that, in the end, we are no nearer to possessing a self-
standing, complete explanation of behaviour even if we adopt the 
behaviourist stance. Instead, we end up with an infinite regress of 
intentional explanations. 
 
Those who would hold a behaviourist view of non-human animals and 
deny the same for humans are in a tenuous position. Given our 
similarities with non-human animals (illustrated by the fact that the 
intentional stance often does work in predicting the behaviour of non-
human animals), it seems unreasonable to assume that intentionality can 
actually be applied to humans if it cannot also be applied to non-human 
animals. Griffin expresses this point beautifully: 
 
Accepting the reality of our evolutionary 
relationship to other animals, it is unparsimonious 
to assume a rigid dichotomy of interpretation 
which insists that mental experiences have some 
                                                          
43 D. Griffin, Animal Thinking, (Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1984), p.24. 
44 R. Routley, ‘Alleged Problems in Attributing Beliefs and Intentionality to Animals’, 
Inquiry, 24/4, (1981), p.411. 
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effect on the behaviour of one species of animals 
but none at all on others.45  
 
Thus if we assume the behaviourist position, we can see that the 
problem in not attributing beliefs and intentions to non-human animals 
bleeds into the problem of attributing beliefs and intentions to any 
animals, including humans. 
 
 
 
 
Part VI 
 
I put my arm around their waist 
And sat right down beside them. 
I calmed them down, 
 Poor empty pants 
 With nobody inside them.46  
 
Having recognised GP’s status as an intentional being, Everyperson 
shows consideration for the feelings and well-being of GP. In this stanza 
it is evident that whether or how we attribute beliefs and intentions to 
non-human animals is directly related to certain ethical considerations 
about our interactions with non-human animals. The standard 
‘scientific’ viewpoint is that non-human animals are not intentional 
beings, and that they are therefore not within our sphere of moral 
concern. This view is espoused by Carruthers, who concludes that  
 
the arguments of Regan and Singer for extending 
the principle of equal consideration of interests to animals...were 
in any case founded on a false 
premise. For both assume that animal desires and 
animal experiences are relevantly similar to our 
own - in particular, that they are conscious ones.47  
 
If Carruthers’ argument is correct, and animals are not ‘appropriate 
objects of moral concern’,48  we may be able to perform animal 
experiments or practise factory farming without overstepping any 
moral boundaries. The fact that our current practices relating to non-
human animals operate without considering non-human animal 
                                                          
45 As quoted in Regan, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, p.35. 
46 Seuss, ‘What Was I Scared Of?’ 
47 Carruthers, ‘The Animals Issue’, p.191. 
48 Ibid., p.193. 
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interests as equal to our own would seem to indicate that the above 
view is held by many people in, if not most members of, our society. 
 
Such established practices and customs cannot be taken lightly, and 
have an inestimable influence on philosophical or scientific 
investigations into the subject of non-human animal intentionality. One 
of the problems, then, in attributing beliefs and intentionality to non-
human animals may be that to do so would be to acknowledge that non-
human animals are worthy of moral consideration, which would almost 
definitely entail the cessation of the aforementioned practices. The 
reluctance of people to attribute intentionality to non-human animals 
may therefore have more to do with  a desire to continue current 
practises involving animals than it has to do with the quality or indeed 
the quantity of the evidence for or against non-human animal 
intentionality. 
 
The question which Carruthers and other proponents of this view fail to 
address adequately is whether or not moral consideration of other 
beings should hinge on the attribution of beliefs and intentions by us. If 
we answer that it should, we have yet to gather conclusive evidence that 
non-human animals are or are  not intentional beings. But it is also 
possible that we can include non-human animals in our moral sphere, 
even if we cannot determine whether a being is intentional or not. For 
instance, it is certainly possible to imagine that pain behaviour exhibited 
by a slug (I choose a slug for my example because a slug is a less-likely 
candidate for intentionality) writhing in salt is indicative of genuine 
suffering, even if we are not willing to attribute belief and intentions, as 
we know them, to such a creature. 
 
Surely, when possible beings of moral concern are in question, it is 
pertinent to err on the side of caution rather than to jump to conclusions 
which, if it were discovered that non-human animals were intentional 
beings worthy of our moral consideration, would have done 
incalculable damage in the meantime. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that there are several problems inherent in the intentional 
stance, arising from the potential anthropocentrism and 
anthropomorphism of the human interpreter. Sections II, III and IV 
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particularly emphasise the fact that a major problem in attributing 
beliefs and intentions to non-human animals lies in the type of 
assumptions inherent in the typical intentional stance. I have shown that 
these assumptions, such as that of rationality and of the faculty of 
language, lead to conditions which may be too stringent in the case of 
non-human animals, whereas weaker indications of such would be 
enough to satisfy criteria for attributing beliefs and intentions to 
humans. 
 
On the other hand, there are equally problems if we choose not to 
attribute intentionality to non-human animals, and these in fact cause 
more problems than adopting the intentional stance in the first place. As 
my discussion of behaviourism in Part V illustrates, the grounds for 
attributing beliefs and intentions to humans are undermined if we do 
not acknowledge the presence of such in non-human animals. In light of 
this point, a tenuous position such as  animal behaviourism is more 
likely to be adopted toward non-human animals only, in order to avoid 
facing the possibility of having to treat non-human animals as objects of 
moral concern. 
 
Nonetheless, because it is so accessible and relatively reliable, most of us 
cannot avoid adopting - at one stage or another - the intentional stance 
toward another being. However, just as Everyperson’s experience 
illustrates, such a stance is fallible. To draw any reliable conclusions the 
stance must not be applied without consideration of contingencies, 
differences between the non-human animals in question and ourselves, 
and other variables. It is of too much value to be dismissed. And there 
remains the possibility that, for all of our scientific studies, the 
intentional stance (applied cautiously) may remain the best way to 
understand and predict the behaviour of non-human animals. This final 
point, I believe, is one which Thomas Nagel has been making all along. 
In his words: 
 
There are things about the world and life and 
ourselves that cannot be adequately understood 
from a maximally objective standpoint, however 
much it may extend our understanding beyond the 
point from which we started. A great deal is 
essentially connected to a particular point of view, 
or type of point of view, and the attempt to give a  
complete account of the world in objective terms  
detached from these perspectives inevitably leads  
to false reductions or outright denial that certain  
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patently real phenomena exist at all.49  
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Ethics and Animal Biotechnology: 
An analysis against the background of 
public policy in the Netherlands 
 
  
Frans W.A. Brom and Egbert Schroten 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
evelopments in animal biotechnology are debated in a lively 
manner, not only in the Netherlands, but in many other 
countries as well. This technology mobilizes strong forces in 
society. On the one hand it is said that it holds a promise for the 
production of vital life-saving preparations and huge economic benefits, 
on the other hand it seems to reduce animals - our fellow creatures, 
closely related to us - to production machines. People have the strong 
conviction that the development of animal biotechnology is morally 
problematic and that to secure some basic values public policy is 
necessary.1 
 
What are the anxieties and which basic values are at stake? That is the 
question we want to answer in this article. In doing so we shall refer to 
public debate in the Netherlands, which concentrates on transgenic 
(farm) animals, because it is our strong conviction that (at least some of) 
the issues which are being discussed in our country will arise in any 
discussion about moral questions in animal biotechnology. 
 
Public concern 
 
Why is animal biotechnology on the agenda? In Dutch society, but not 
only there, public concern about biotechnology can be specified in the 
following way).2 The public is not very well informed about what is 
                                                          
1  cf. Europbarometre 39/1, Europeans, Science and Technology, Public Understanding and 
Attitudes by INRA (Europe) and Report International, Commission of the European 
Communities: EUR 15461 (European Union, Brussels, 1993).  
2 Report of the Advisory Committee on Ethics and Biotechnology in Animals. (Title: Ethics and 
Biotechnology in Animals), (NRLO, Wageningen, 1990), p.7ff.  
D 
 
 
 38 
going on. There is a gap between science and technology on one side 
and the public on the other. To many people biotechnology seems to be 
very opaque. It is developed in laboratories - behind 'closed' doors - by 
specialists. They are like 'magicians' who are 'playing God' by 
manipulating life in an incomprehensible way. 
 
What are the consequences of biotechnology? This is an important 
concern, which may be interpreted in, at least, two directions: there is a 
fear of risks, perhaps in the long run (cf. for instance Softenon kids, DES 
daughters!) and on the other side there is a fear concerning the slippery 
slope, especially in view of the application of genetic technology to 
human beings, since (higher) animals - biologically closely related to us - 
are the object of  biotechnological changes. 
 
This so-called 'makeability' of new forms of life is another source for 
anxiety. Influenced perhaps by the media, the Animal Protection 
Movement, and by science fiction, the public realize that science and 
science fiction lie closely together. Call it the 'Boys of Brasil' or 'Jurassic 
Park' effect.  
 
Moreover, the use of animals in itself causes questions. There is an 
increasing concern regarding the exploitation of animals in scientific 
research and bio-industry. People see genetic modification as another 
step in the direction of the reduction of animals to instruments of 
production. Animals are used as mere things.3 
  
Concern about the social-economic consequences may be mentioned 
separately. Farmers for instance are afraid of becoming (more) depen-
dant on pharmaceutical industries, particularly because of the 
probability of patenting biotechnological inventions in the field of 
agriculture and stock breeding. Moreover, what are the consequences 
for the developing countries? Some people fear that biotechnology will 
not feed the world but that patenting will make third world countries 
more dependant on western industries.  
 
Last but not least, there is a credibility problem, an atmosphere of 
distrust towards science and technology. Scientific developments are 
driven by economic forces. According to many people the real goal of 
science and technology is economic gain, although they claim to pursue 
the 'common good'. Moreover science and technology seem to develop 
autonomously. How is it possible to influence or direct these far 
                                                          
3 M.B.H. Visser and F. J. Grommers, eds., Dier of Ding. Objectivering van dieren (Animal 
or Thing. Animals as Objects) (Pudoc, Wageningen, 1988).  
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reaching developments in a democratic society? How can we  prevent 
the technocrats from manipulating public opinion? And when 
democratic control is possible, the question of the direction of the 
development becomes relevant. It forces us to ask whether technological 
development is a good thing in itself. If we say ‘It serves progress’, then 
it is necessary to know what progress is.4 
 
That these anxieties were all present in Dutch society was confirmed by 
public debate, in May 1993, on genetic modification of animals.5  Much 
attention was paid to the slippery slope between animal biotechnology 
and application to genetic modification of human beings. The majority 
position of the lay panel resulted in a plea for a moratorium on genetic 
modification. 
 
 
 
Growing awareness of the moral status of animals  
 
One of the key points of public concern is the moral 'status' of animals. 
What is their position in morality? In order to clarify public debate on 
animal biotechnology it may be helpful to make some historical remarks 
on the position of animals in society.6 In Dutch society, there has been 
an increasing consciousness of the fact that animals are to be considered 
as objects of moral concern. One might distinguish here four steps. 
 
In the first step cruelty to animals is seen as morally wrong. It is 
interesting to note, however, that, although it is recognized that animals 
can suffer, traditional arguments against cruelty are that it degenerates a 
person's moral quality7 or that it  causes public offence (e.g. Dutch Penal 
Code of 1886). 
 
                                                          
4 F. van Vugt and F. Brom, ‘Animal Biotechnology and Society: What are the issues?’ in 
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Animal Biotechnology, ed. M. McGloughlin 
(The Biotechnology Program, University of California, Davis, 1994), p.2: ‘But then what 
is progress? Is there a clear and unambiguous picture of where to go to bring us to a 
better situation? A Dutch comedian once defined progress as the situation in which all 
eskimos live in a centrally heated house and have to do their best to save money to buy 
a refrigerator. 
5 A.M. Hamstra and M.H. Feenstra, Publiek Debat: Genetische modificante van dieren, mag 
dat? Projectverslag en evaluatie (Public Debate: Genetic modification of animals, is that 
allowed? Project report and evaluation), (SWOKA, The Hague, 1994).  
6 F.W.A. Brom and E. Scroten, ‘Ethical questions around animal biotechnology. The 
Dutch approach.’, Livestock Production Science, 36, (1993), p.100f.  
7 I.Kant, ‘Grounding for the Metaphysics’ in Ethical Philosophy, I Kant (Hackett 
Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1785/1983).  
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In the second step experiments with animals are considered as a moral 
problem. Therefore they have to be justified. The proportionality 
argument enters into the discussion: End and means should be balanced 
against each other. Regulations concerning experiments with animals 
are not based on the degeneration of a person's moral quality but on the 
insight that animals themselves deserve protection.8 
 
Thirdly, bioindustry and intensive cattle breeding become a moral 
problem. People realize that animal welfare is being threatened in 
factory farms. Farm animals run the risk of being reduced to mere 
production machines. There is an increasing awareness that animals 
have a moral status of their own, which is not to be reduced to a mere 
instrumental value for human ends.9 
 
The most recent step is induced by developments in animal 
biotechnology. In the Netherlands the genetically modified bull Herman 
may be considered as a catalyst for this phase of the debate, which is 
still going on. Several points are discussed. We confine ourselves to two 
points: 
 
1 Is the possibility to change the genetic make up of animals just 
another step in the process of domestication? Some call the new 
possibilities a sharp break10 and state that we need a new framework 
to discuss it. Others say it is business as usual and that therefore there 
is no problem at all. And finally there are people who seem to agree 
that animal biotechnology is in a sense business as usual but that this 
shows that domestication in itself is problematic.11 Behind these 
discussions there is a fundamental layer: philosophical and religious 
considerations in terms of Creation or evolution. Genetic 
modification is often seen as a violation of Creation or of 'the order of 
                                                          
8 A.N. Rowan and F.M. Loew, The animal research controversy, protest, process and public 
policy (Center for Animals and Public Policy, Tufts University School of Veterinary 
Medicine, Tuft, 1995).  
9 R. Harrison, Animal machines: the new factory farming industry  (Methuen, London, 
1964); P.R. Weipkema, Gedrag, welzijn en duurzaamheld (Behaviour, Welfare and 
Sustainability) (Agricultural University, Wageningen, 1993).  
10 ‘Report of the Advisory Committee on Ethics and Biotechnology in Animals’, p.12. 
11 For instance H. Verhoog, ‘Ethics and genetic engineering of animals’, in Morality, 
Worldview and Law; The Idea of a Universal Morality and its Critics, ed. A.A. Musschenga, 
G.Voorzanger and A. Soeterman (Van Gorcum, Assen, 1992), p.275: ‘The decision to 
interfere in the life of wild animals and to cage or domesticate them, becomes the first 
and very basic encroachment upon the intrinsic value of animals’. 
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Nature'. It is interesting to note that in the context of biotechnology 
the term 'playing God' pops up again and again.12 
 
2 Is animal biotechnology hazardous for the well-being of the animals 
involved? Since the experiments in Beltsville, Maryland in 1985 it is 
clear that genetic modification can cause great harm. In this 
experiment an attempt was made to change the meat-fat ratio by 
introducing foreign growth-promoting genes into pigs’ genome. This 
experiment caused (unintended) consequences. The transgenic pigs 
made in this experiment were very ill. They had ‘a high incidence of 
gastric ulcers, arthritis, cardiomegaly, dermatitis, and renal disease.’13 
This brings us to a central point in the discussion on animal 
biotechnology: do we know what we are doing?  
 
One of the consequences of this process of increasing moral concern in 
Dutch society has been the acknowledgment, by the government, of the 
'intrinsic value' of animals as a basis for official policy-making, from 
1981 onwards.14 Recognizing the 'intrinsic value' of animals means that 
they are brought into the realm of morality. (We'll come back to this 
later on.) 
 
In this context, the role of the Animal Protection Movement should be 
mentioned. It has been (and still is) very important for public discussi-
on. Its position in Dutch society is less polarized than in other countries. 
Staff members are on speaking terms with official policy makers.  
 
 
 
Animals as proper objects of moral concern 
 
How should we assess this development from a moral point of view? 
For we have to be careful not to make the mistake of a historical or 
sociological fallacy: developments in society as such are not morally 
normative. Feelings are facts and therefore they have to be taken 
seriously. But they are morally ambiguous. At best, they are markers of 
moral values not of moral decisions. The public concerns state different 
problems for ethical theory, like the status of nature, the fear for a 
slippery slope and so on. 
                                                          
12 E. Scroten, ‘Playing God. Some Theological Comments on a Metaphor’ in Christian 
Faith and Philosophical  Theology. Essays in Honour of Vincent Brummer, eds. G. Van den 
Brink et al (Kok/Pharos, Kampen, 1992). 
13 V.G. Pursel et al., ‘Genetic Engineering of Livestock’, Science, 244, (1989), p.1281.  
14 cf. Rijksoverheid en Dierenbescherming (National Government and Animal Protection), 
The Hague, Dutch Lower Chamber no. 16966-2, 1981.  
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We want to focus on one of problems involved; the so-called 'intrinsic 
value' of animals. It is used quite often in discussions on animal 
biotechnology, but it is not always clear what is meant by it. 'Intrinsic 
value' may have three different meanings.15 
 
In a traditional moral context it means that a value is to be pursued for 
its own sake, whereas other values are instrumental. Take 'happiness' 
for example. We all hope and strive to be happy. In view of the 
(intrinsic) value of happiness values like money, love or knowledge are 
instrumental, in the sense that they may be instruments for becoming 
happy. By this example it may be clear that, in the traditional moral 
context, there are not many intrinsic values. Most values are, in some 
way or the other, instrumental. 
 
In discussions on animal biotechnology, however, the term 'intrinsic 
value' is not being used in its traditional sense. It is not likely that we see 
animals as values to be pursued for their own sake. The meaning of the 
expression is, rather, that animals have an inherent worthiness, a wor-
thiness of their own.16 They are not things, mere instruments or 
machines, but they are sentient beings, fellow creatures. In the context of 
biotechnology, then, the term 'intrinsic value' of animals is a way to 
express the point that animals, as sentient beings, are having, so to say, a 
'plus' apart from their instrumental value. The acknowledgment of this 
'plus' has become a cornerstone in Dutch legislation and official policy. 
 
This meaning of the term 'intrinsic value' of animals has an important 
implication: Animals become morally relevant. They are proper objects 
of our moral concern. In other words, we are not allowed to do with 
them just whatever we like. In some way or the other we should show a 
certain respect as to their worthiness. As it is said in an official report17 : 
 
Especially the criticism of the use of animals as experimental animals 
and of  livestock housing has resulted in the recognition that animals 
have a value of their own, or an intrinsic value, besides their instru-
mental  value to man. In other words, man has to respect the intrinsic 
value of animals. Animals come to fall under the province of ethics, not 
in the sense that animals are thought to act morally, but in the sense that 
they are deserving our moral care. 
                                                          
15 F.W.A. Brom, Dierlijke Biotechnologie als moreel probleem (Animal biotechnology as a 
moral problem) Thesis Utrecht University (Van Gorcum, Assen, 1997).  
16 Verhoog, ‘Ethics and genetic engineering of animals’, p.270.  
17 ‘Report of the Advisory Committee on Ethics and Biotechnology in Animals’, p.8. 
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We conclude that 'intrinsic value', as a term to characterize the moral 
status of animals, might be seen as the basic concept of an ethical theory 
and practice as to the human-animal relationship. In this sense it may be 
compared with a term like 'human dignity', another basic concept in 
ethical theory and practice. 
   
Meanwhile, we have to admit that the content of the concept of 'intrinsic 
value' is rather vague. Does it mean that the Kantian principle 'never be 
treated solely as a means but always also as an end' should apply on 
animals? We don't think so. In the case of animals it means that animals 
have a 'plus', apart from their instrumental value for us, that they are 
proper objects of our moral concern. However it is not clear how this 
value should be operationalized in view of our behaviour and, more  
generally, the implications for public policy. But we think that the 
recognition that  animals deserve our moral concern is a necessary step 
before we can decide what  our moral concern in a concrete situation 
ought to be. In order to deal with concrete situations much work has to 
be done in shaping a clear conceptual framework and in specifying 
moral rules. It is foreseeable that in answering these questions 
consensus is far away.  
 
 
 
Public policy and law in the Netherlands 
   
One of the problems is that we live in a multiform society, in which 
there are a variety of answers to ethical questions. So we are facing a 
problem here. From the point of view of public morality we find 
ourselves in a situation of uncertainty. This uncertainty has, at least, two 
aspects, namely a moral and a political aspect. That is to say, the fact 
that we face an uncertainty in moralibus  means that we are facing 
difficulties in policy making as well. As a matter of fact, policy makers 
have to cope with a problem that has four dimensions: (1) Public 
feelings, (2) moral problems, (3) philosophical and religious convictions, 
and (4) consequences for (public) policy. So, the problem we are facing 
is: How to deal with this uncertainty in (public) morality?  
 
In this situation of uncertainty, in the Netherlands, a 'no unless policy' is 
being developed concerning animal biotechnology. Genetic 
modification of animals is ruled by three different kinds of legislation: 
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1 All genetic modification is controlled from a safety point of view: 
transgenic animals fall under GMO-regulations (GMO = Genetically 
Modified Organisms). 
 
2 Animal experimentation is only allowed in licensed institutions. 
These institutions need a company-based committee that advises the 
company on acceptability of the experiments. Experiments are 
allowed if the human interests at stake are of greater value than 
animal discomfort caused by the experiment. Transgenic animals fall 
under this law if their making is an animal experiment, or if they are 
used in an animal experiment.  
 
3 In 1992 the Animal Health and Welfare Act (AHWA) passed 
parliament after ten years of political discussion. It takes the form of a 
general law which (partly) has a 'no unless' structure: Acts which are 
dangerous to animal welfare are forbidden unless  permitted by 
special regulation. Under the AHWA genetic modification of animals, 
cloning and the making of chimaeras is not permitted unless assent is 
given by the Minister of Agriculture, Nature Management and 
Fisheries. This permission will only be given after assessment of the 
moral acceptability of the project by an independent advisory 
committee of experts. 
 
This means that any research project in the field of genetic modification 
of animals has to be assessed not only concerning the scientific quality 
and the risk aspects but concerning the ethical aspects as well. Biotech-
nological activities with animals are prohibited by the government 
unless it is not reasonable to think that relevant values are violated, or 
unless the aim is so important that the violation of these values may be 
overruled. In other words, there must be good reasons for carrying 
them out. This procedure is not meant to hamper the development of 
animal biotechnology, but it has to function as a tool against public fear. 
 
To add to this 'no unless policy' we would suggest a distinction between 
two interpretations: (1) in principle and (2) in practice. From a moral 
point of view one can react to animal biotechnology with a conditional 
'yes'. In other words, in principle it can be permitted to interfere in the 
genetic make-up of animals.  From the perspective of public policy, 
however, we would suggest to react to animal biotechnology with a 'no 
unless'; not as a sign of hostility or conservatism but as a sign of care 
and caution in a situation of uncertainty as it has been indicated above. 
In short: a policy of prudence. 
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Evaluation framework 
 
This assessment procedure involves the use of an 'evaluation 
framework'. The question 'What are good reasons?' has to be answered 
in the light of this evaluation framework. In this framework some 
principles play a role, reflecting the idea that animals enter into our 
moral horizon. These principles are partly a 'translation' into the animal 
realm of the four basic principles of bioethics18 (autonomy, beneficence, 
non-maleficence and justice): 
 
Respect for the 'integrity' of animals 
This principle states that we should respect the 'wholeness' of the 
individual animal and its species-specific behaviour. Biotechnology 
should strive to keep the homeostasis (self-regulation) of an animal 
intact.19 
 
Non-maleficence 
This principle states that we should try to refrain from harming animals. 
And if we cause harm towards animals we should strive to minimalise 
it. Under this principle we can think of the ‘Three R's’ of animal 
experimentation (Replace animal use where possible, Reduce animal use 
where possible, and Refine animal research techniques so as to reduce 
animal pain and distress as much as possible).20 
 
Beneficence  
This principle states that we should care for animal health and welfare. 
Research projects in animal biotechnology should not only strive to 
refrain from harm but should also try to promote animal health and 
wellbeing.  
  
Proportionality 
If we do harm an animal, the end should justify the means. ‘Even 
moderate levels of unrelieved suffering must be ethically countered by 
an arguable important scientific goal and a well-designed protocol. The 
more acute the suffering, the more important the goal and tighter the 
                                                          
18 cf. T.L. Beauchamp and J.D. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, second edition 
(Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford, 1983).  
19 F.R. Heeger, ‘Respect for Animal Integrity?’ in Science, Ethics, Sustainability: The 
Responsibility of Science in Attaining Sustainable Development (Studies in Bioethics and 
Research Ethics 2) (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala, 1997), pp.243-252. 
20 W.M.S. Russel and R.L. Burch, The Principles of Humane Experimental Techniques, 
(Methuen, London, 1959) 
 
 
 46 
design, until we reach moral repugnance and the possible “beyond the 
pale” experiment.’21  
 
In addition to these four principles two other principles have been 
formulated: 
 
Possibility of redress  
The redress-principle is a type of precautionary principle. It has been 
derived from the work of the German ethicist Rendtorff.22  The core 
content for the field of animal biotechnology is, that in using this 
technology one has to act in such a way that one can be corrected by the 
consequences of one’s actions. This first aspect of the principle is  the 
question of safety-measures. In order to be able to be redressed by the 
consequences of particular action, these consequences need to be 
assessed. It is, however impossible to assess all consequences of an 
action. Some unforseen consequences might become irreversible. This 
means that it is not possible to introduce a new technology without 
taking a risk. The principle of redress implies that in advance, in 
planning the application of a biotechnology (in an animal) the risk has 
to be assessed and safety-measures have to be taken. 
  
The principle of redress, however, goes further. Even if we take in 
advance safety-measures, we still take risks. Despite our safety-
measures, things might go wrong. This is the way, the redress-principle 
goes beyond the question of safety. Safety-measures alone are not 
enough to justify the risks of the introduction of new technologies. 
According to the principle of redress another question has to be 
answered. 'Have we done enough to imagine the possible 
consequences?' By answering this question, we take responsibility, not 
only for what we know, but also for what we should know.23 In this 
way we take responsibility for the possible consequences of actions we 
plan, beyond the consequences we actually know.  
 
 
 
                                                          
21 S. Donnelley and K. Nolan eds., ‘Animals, Science and Ethics’, Hastings Center Report, 
Special Supplement: The Ethics of Animal Experimentation and Research. May/June 
(1990), p.12.   
22 T. Rendtorff, Ethik. Grundelementen, Methodologie und Konkretionen einer ethischen 
Theologie; Zweite Auflage (Ethics, Elements, Methodology and Applications; Second Edition) 
(Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1990), p.133.  
23 In this way the principle of redress has a connection with Hans Jonas’ principle of 
responsibility (H. Jonas, Das Prinzip Ver antworung. Versug einer Ethik fur die 
technologisch Zivilisation (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1979/1989). 
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Controllability 
 
The principle of redress shows, that we can not introduce a new 
technology without taking some risks. Therefore we need also a 
principle of controllability. In an open and democratic society actions 
that touch upon important common values (such as safety) need to be 
discussed in the open. Public access towards information and effective 
democratic control are important corner-stones of modern democracies. 
Animal biotechnology, because of its opaqueness is in need of structures 
that can help in creating this oneness. 
 
The burden of proof, then, is on the side of the one who wants to be 
involved in biotechnological activities. This has an important ethical 
impact: it challenges scientists and policy makers to make explicit their 
own moral judgments. In other words, they are challenged to reflect on 
what they are doing from a moral point of view. As mentioned above, 
we do not think that this procedure is meant to hamper the 
development of animal biotechnology. It is a tool to implement the 
principles previously stated. 
  
The research institute has to do its own ethical evaluation. In this way 
ethics is not an 'extra' that comes from the outside but it may become 
integrated within normal decision-making structures. The committee of 
experts looks at the evaluation and their advice will be based on the 
assessment of it. The advisory-report with both the evaluation of the 
researchers and the assessment of the committee will be public.24 
Individuals and pressure groups will get the opportunity to give their 
opinion before the minister decides whether or not an assent is given. In 
this way the controllability principle is applied. 
  
The idea behind this policy is that, if we follow it, then it may become 
more and more clear what it means to acknowledge the moral status of 
animals and how that may be operationalized. In other words, a case by 
case approach is chosen, hoping that it may have a heuristic function. 
This heuristic function is necessary because of the vagueness of the 
values at stake and the uncertainties of consequences of these 
developments. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 It is of course allowed to keep scientific and technical information secret for 
commercial reasons.  
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Final remarks 
 
* The recognition that animals deserve our moral concern is a corner-
stone for public policy and for political and ethical discussions. The 
recognition that animals deserve our moral concern is a necessary 
step before we can decide what our moral concern in a concrete 
situation ought to be. 
 
* Any discussion on the ethical aspects of animal biotechnology should 
aim at operationalisation in at least three directions:  Public policy, 
business policy, and professional behaviour. In this discussion 
various aspects should be taken into account: Scientific, economic, 
environmental, social, ethical, political. And no aspect can have an a 
priori or absolute precedence over the others.25 
 
* Biotechnologists and policy makers should not be neglecting cultural 
changes such as the ecological perspective and the increasing 
awareness that animals are within our moral horizon. Neither should 
they make the mistake to underestimate the importance of emotional 
strands in public opinion. We would like to underline, here, that 
animal biotechnology will only have a future if society wants to 
accept it. 
* The Dutch 'no unless policy' implies a project-wise evaluation which 
has an important ethical impact. It challenges scientists and policy-
makers to make their moral judgements explicit. Moreover, this 
policy aims to create an open forum for public discussion. Such a 
policy is taking public concern and moral reflection seriously. In that 
way citizens are taken seriously, a necessity for any open and 
democratic society. 
  
* It is important to create an ethical assessment procedure that can 
have a heuristic function. The vagueness of the values at stake asks 
for clarification and (new) moral insights. 
 
 
A slightly different version of this article appears in Italian: F.W.A. 
Brom en E. Schroten, ‘L’etica e la biotechnoligia animal. Un’analisi sullo 
sfonde della politica pubblica nei Paessi Bassi’. In P. Bisogno, ed. 
Prometheus, Rivista internazionale di politica della scienza: Bioetica: le ragioni 
della vita e della scienza, 22 (Franco Angeli, Milano, 1996).  
                                                          
25 S. Donnelley, ‘Philosophic and Ethical Challenges of Animal Biotechnology’, Hastings 
Center Report, 24/1, (1994), Special Supplement: The Brave New World of Animal 
Biotechnology, S. 20.  
 
   
 
49 
 
 
 
Biography 
 
Dr. Frans W.A. Brom is an ethicist at Utrecht University (Faculty of Theology 
and the Center for Bio-ethics and Health Law) and he was co-secretary of the 
Provisional Committee for the ethical assessment of animal biotechnology. Prof. 
dr. Egbert Schroten is Chair of the Animal Biotechnology Committee and 
member of the Group of Advisers on Ethical Implications of Biotechnology (of 
the EC). He is Professor for Christian Ethics and Director of the Center for 
Bioethics and Health Law at Utrecht University.  
 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
   
 
51 
Xenotransplantation: Do we have an 
alternative? 
 
 
Gurch Randhawa 
  
 
 
ecent advances in technology have made the possibility of 
xenotransplantation becoming a routine procedure a distinct 
reality in the next couple of years. This news does not bode well 
with all parties and has reopened the issues and controversies 
surrounding xenotransplantation which were last hotly debated in the 
case of Baby Fae over a decade ago. Recent television current affairs 
programmes in the UK such as Panorama have sought to disentangle 
the multitude of complex issues. However no clear solution has become 
apparent. The debates around xenotransplantation have been limited as 
they have not engaged with those involved with alternative human 
procurement programmes. These have been structured with the 
presumption that xenotransplantation is the only viable long-term 
solution. This may not be so and could be wherein lies the answer to the 
shortage of organs for transplantation. 
 
Under current procurement arrangements, the use of cadaveric donors 
and living donors is not going to ensure a large enough supply of 
organs, especially in cases of kidney and heart disease. In the UK, there 
are over 6,000 people waiting for a suitable organ for transplantation.1  
While in the US, only a quarter of the estimated 100,000 people awaiting 
transplant are likely to receive a new organ.2  The UK and the US 
currently employ what might broadly be termed an 'opting-in' legal 
system. Other countries which operate under a similar statute are  
Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
This system relies upon voluntarism and is seen in practice with the use 
of donor cards and the recently introduced British NHS Organ Donor 
Register. Other procurement programmes which have been 
implemented throughout the world with varying success are presumed 
                                                          
1 United Kingdom Transplant Support Service Authority, Human organ information sheet 
(UKTSSA Publicity Services, Bristol, 1997) 
2 F. Koechlin, ‘The Animal Heart of the Matter: Xenotransplantation and the threat of 
new diseases’, The Ecologist, 26, 1996, pp.93-97. 
R 
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consent (also known as opting-out), elective ventilation, non-heart 
beating donor, routine enquiry,  and required request. These will be 
explained below. The most recent and radical solution to reduce the 
scarcity in organs is the development of xenotransplantation - the use of 
animal organs for transplant.   
 
 
 
Xenotransplantation 
 
The early 60s saw the first breakthrough in xenotransplantation when a 
patient survived nine months with a kidney from a chimpanzee. Five 
other patients who underwent the same procedure died within days. 
Liver transplantation was also attempted from chimpanzee to human 
but was unsuccessful. In the early 80s a baboon heart was transplanted 
into a baby girl known as ‘Baby Fae’, this unfortunately also failed after 
20 days.3  
 
The most recent development  has been the use of a pig as a donor. The 
pig has been identified as being a suitable organ donor on size and 
anatomical grounds. Research is being carried out in Cambridge, 
England and New Jersey, US, where it is hoped the strong human 
immunological response to foreign tissue can be overcome with 
genetically altered pigs. The idea is to trick the human immunological 
response into thinking the pig's heart is its own.4 The justification for 
such work is that if it is morally defensible to use animals for food then 
using them as a potential supply of organs is acceptable. 
 
Clearly, this solution and reasoning is controversial and raises some 
ethical issues. One of the main questions that needs to be addressed is 
whether the ethical issues involved in the breeding of animals for food 
and those involved in the breeding of animals for organs are the same. I 
would argue that the issues involved are separate and should be 
considered on their own merits. The acceptability of one practice does 
not necessarily legitimise the other. The debate about breeding animals 
for food is a hotly contested area in Britain today and it arouses strong 
emotions. Surely, neither practice is necessary for human health and 
survival as alternative options are available.  
                                                          
3 H.S. Schwartz, ‘Bioethical and legal considerations in increasing the supply of 
transplantable organs: from UAGA to Baby Fae’, American Journal of Law and Medicine. 
10, (1985), pp.397-438.  
4 F. Koechin, ‘The Animal Heart of the Matter: Xenotransplantation and the threat of 
new diseases’, The Ecologist, 26, (1996), pp.93-97.  
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Others have argued that  whilst it is generally believed to be morally 
acceptable to kill animals for food, this is under circumstances which 
offer us alternatives. No one has to eat pork to survive - on the contrary, 
it would often be much cheaper and healthier to rely on other sources of 
sustenance. With organs for transplantation, however, particularly 
hearts and livers, there is no alternative for a significant proportion of 
people who would otherwise die. Under these circumstances, those who 
wish to deny the use of animal organs for transplantation must provide 
even more compelling arguments than those who would wish to deny 
their use for food.5  
 
The UK has a multi-faith population and it is important to recognise the 
views of different religious groups. For some religions, certain animals 
are considered sacred, thus organs from these animals would be 
unacceptable. For example, in Hinduism the cow is sacred whereas for 
Jews and Muslims the pig is considered unclean.  
 
Medical concerns should also be paramount with the problems of 
hyperacute rejection and the spread of new diseases in humans still to 
be overcome. As mentioned previously, the Cambridge research team 
have made progress in the former area by using genetically altered pigs 
but are still struggling to come to terms with the latter issue. The 
research into transfer of diseases from one species to another is well 
documented. Common examples include influenza viruses which have 
their origins in pigs, ducks, and chickens which act as reservoirs for the 
diseases. Most worrying of all, is research in Central Africa which 
suggests that AIDS resulted from a transfer of the monkey virus into 
humans.6  
 
The financial gains from xenotransplantation are most considerable and 
may well impede scientists from taking an objective approach when 
considering the ethics of such a procedure. Large pharmaceutical 
companies such as Novartis and Imutran in Europe and Alexion and 
Nextran in the US, are investing millions of pounds into 
xenotransplantation research. Projected profits from 
xenotransplantation could reach as much as US$5 billion in 2010.7 Those 
who support xenotransplantation need to be clear whether their 
interests are altruistic or financially motivated. 
                                                          
5 B. New, M. Solomon, R. Dingwall, and J. McHale, A question of give and take: Improving 
the supply of donor organs for transplantation (King’s Fund Institute, London, 1994).  
6 Koechlin, ‘The Animal Heart of the Matter’. 
7 Ibid. 
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In 1996, the UK's Department of Health set up an Advisory Group on 
the Ethics of Xenotransplantation. Their recent findings have indicated 
that xenotransplantation is permissible on ethical grounds but there are 
still some medical concerns that need to be researched further.8 The 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics has also  considered the issue and raised 
no objection.9 However, careful scrutiny of the membership of these 
advisory groups is required as was highlighted in the case of Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopothy (BSE) investigation. Some governmental 
advisers had a vested stake in the treatment and eradication of BSE thus 
it was unclear whose interests were really being met by their 
recommendations.10 Those with connections with pharmaceutical 
companies and surgical teams involved in xenotransplantation may also 
find it difficult to offer an impartial opinion. 
 
With the risk of a variety of diseases spreading into humans coupled 
with the ethics of xenotransplantation, further consideration should be 
given to the alternative procurement programmes.  
 
 
 
Alternative procurement arrangements 
 
Opting-in  - The opting-in system operates with the use of donor cards 
and more recently the British NHS Organ Donor Register. For this 
system to have a direct impact, either a donor card must be found on the 
body of the deceased at or shortly after the time of death, or, the 
deceased person's name should be on the Organ Donor Register. The 
Register is accessible to each of the Transplant Co-ordinators who are 
able to check the Register first, each time they have a potential donor to 
consider. This register is aimed at providing a more efficient method of 
discovering whether a deceased person wanted to donate their organs.  
 
In March 1996, the British Department of Health launched a national 
publicity campaign encouraging people to sign up for the Organ Donor 
Register. Full page advertisements were placed in national newspapers 
and prime-time television advertising was used. These measures, 
                                                          
8 The Advisory Group on the Ethics of Xenotransplantation, Animal tissue into humans 
(Department of Health, London, 1997).  
9 L. Rogers, ‘A heartbeat for history’, Sunday Times, (29th September, 1996).  
10 R. Mckie, J. Jones, A. Bewins, M. Durham and D. Harrison, ‘A conspiracy to drive us 
all mad’, The Observer, (24 March, 1996). 
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however, are going to have little impact unless the issue of 
disseminating information is addressed more closely.11  
 
These efforts made are most commendable but have done little to 
overcome the problem of targeting those individuals who are against 
donation. Increased card carrying or joining the Donor Register among 
those who already support donation is likely to have little impact on the 
donation rate as their families are more likely to consent to donation. 
The underlying problem which really needs to be addressed, is to 
achieve card carrying or signing on the Donor Register by those 
members of the public whose families would otherwise have refused 
consent.12  
 
Presumed Consent  - A presumed consent law presumes that an 
individual has consented to organ donation at the time of death unless 
there is contrary documentary evidence or, in some countries, objections 
by the family.13  Assuming that the commitment of society is strong 
toward donation and that the public trusts the concept and application 
of brain death, this system should theoretically reduce the donor 
shortage drastically. It would also require involved professionals to 
identify those who could be donors, and an efficient organ procurement 
and distribution network. 
 
Presumed consent schemes have been introduced into many countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, and Sweden) 
and also Singapore, although attempts to enact such legislation in the 
UK have always failed. 'Opting-out' was debated in Parliament in 
February 1984, and it was proposed that people would be considered to 
be prospective donors unless an objection was recorded - a wish to 'opt-
out'. There would be no need to consult the next of kin. The proposal 
was criticised as an infringement of personal liberty, people became 
concerned as to the inaccuracy of records, and this opposition, not least 
in the form of letters to Members of Parliament, led to the shelving of 
the plan.14  The latest attempt to legalise 'opting-out', the 
Transplantation of Human Organs Bill in 1993, also failed for similar 
reasons. 
 
                                                          
11 G. Randhawa, ‘Improving the supply of organ donors in the UK: a review of public 
policies’, Health Education Journal, 54, (1995), pp. 241-250.  
12 New et al, ‘A question of give and take’. 
13 Ibid.  
14 D. Lamb, Organ transplants and ethics (Routledge, London, 1990). 
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In practice, it is the case that in most countries with presumed consent, 
transplant teams will not proceed until the family is contacted and 
agrees, even though it is not required by law.15  
 
In the UK at present, public policy relies upon voluntarism, and is seen 
in practice with the use of donor cards and the NHS Organ Donor 
Register. The rights of the next of kin to make decisions on behalf of the 
deceased are still recognised. This reliance upon voluntarism is 
exemplified by the practice of blood donation in the UK which is 
frequently cited as an example of public generosity.16  
 
Elective ventilation  - Over half of the organ donors in the UK are as a 
result of intracranial deaths which have occurred in the Intensive Care 
Unit (ICU).17 However, not all intracranial deaths occur in the ICU; 
some occur in general wards. These patients could also be potential 
organ donors if transferred to the ICU. Patients would then be 
artificially ventilated to preserve the organs until brain-stem death can 
be established.  
 
A protocol for electively ventilating patients has been developed in 
Exeter. This has proved to be most successful, initial predictions 
showing an increase in donors of 50%.18  
 
There are drawbacks to this procedure, the main being that there is a 
risk of patients falling into a persistent vegetative state. Also at present, 
the law relating to consent is a hindrance to this procedure. Elective 
ventilation benefits the organ recipient not the patient. For such 
practice, patient consent would be required but this is not possible as 
the donor would be comatosed before ventilation was even 
considered.19 Such obstacles need to be resolved soon if this procedure 
is to produce a regular supply of organs. A recent report by the British 
Transplant Society has recommended legislation to overcome these 
concerns.20 Large-scale clinical trials are planned in order to effectively 
                                                          
15 New et al, ‘A question of give and take’.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 T.G. Feest, H. N. Riad, C.H. Collins, M.G.S. Golloy, A.J. Nicholls and S.N. Hamad, 
‘Protocol for increasing organ donation after cerebrovascular deaths in a district 
general hospital’, The Lancet, 335, (1990), pp.1133-5.  
19 New et al, ‘A question of give and take’ and B. New, ‘Transplant traumas’, Health 
Service Journal, (12 May 1994), pp. 24-5.  
20 C. Wight and B. Cohen, ‘Shortage of organs for transplantation’, BMJ, 312, (1996), 
pp.989-990 and British Transplantation Society, Report of the working party on organ 
donation’ (BTS, London, 1996).  
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evaluate the potential of elective ventilation. A rigorous ethical protocol 
will need to be in place before such an initiative could commence. 
 
Non-heart beating donor  - This procedure has proved to be very 
successful in the Netherlands.21  The number of transplanted kidneys 
rose by 21% over a 9-year period. In the UK (Leicester) also, over a one 
year period 38% of all transplanted kidneys resulted from non-heart 
beating donors.22 The non-heart beating donor involves donors who 
have not reached brain-stem death. The kidneys are cooled before 
explantation by means of the insertion of an irrigation tube into the 
cadaver so that the kidneys can be protected by cold perfusion until the 
relatives can be found and donation requested. This procedure allows 
those who suffer a fatal cardiac arrest, for example, to nevertheless 
donate their kidneys.23  
 
Success in Holland and Leicester has been attributed to transplant 
surgeons, co-ordinators, and Intensive Care Unit staff all being located 
on one site.24 This will not be the case in all large hospitals and thus the 
success of non-heart beating donors may be limited.  
 
The overriding concern with such a procedure is that in order to cool 
the kidneys a tube is inserted into the cadaver before permission for 
organ donation is obtained. This constitutes invasive surgery solely for 
the purpose of obtaining organs. Such a concern is also pertinent in the 
case of presumed consent.   
 
Routine Enquiry  - It has been alleged that the differences between the 
public's inclination to donate and the number of donated organs is 
explained by the reluctance of involved professionals to donate.25  
Routine enquiry seeks to redress this and is used extensively in the US. 
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1987, which forms the model for 
many state statutes, makes provision for routine enquiry. This initiative 
                                                          
21 G. Koostra, R. Wijnen, J.P. van Hooff and C.J. van der Linden, ‘Twenty per cent more 
kidneys through a non-heart beating programme’, Transplantation Proceedings, 23, 
(1991), pp.910-911.  
22 K. Varty, P.S. Veitch, J.D.T. Morgan, E.O. Kehinde, P.K. Donelly, and P.R.F. Bell, 
‘Response to organ shortage:kidney retrieval programme using non-heart beating 
donors’, BMJ, 308, (1994), p.575. 
23 M.H. Booster, R. Wijnen, Y. Ming, J. Vroemen and G. Koostra, ‘In situ perfusion of 
kidney from non-heart beating donors: the Maastricht protocol’, Transplantation 
Proceedings, 25, (1993), pp.1503-4.  
24 New, ‘Transplant traumas’, Koostra et al, ‘Twenty per cent more kidneys through a 
non-heart beating programme’, and Varty et al, ‘Response to organ shortage’.  
25 F.D. McDonald, ‘Organ donation, new issues, new controversies’, Dialysis and 
Transplantation’,19, (1990), pp.238-239. 
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aims to take advantage of the inclination of the public to donate as 
demonstrated in the polls. It requires the involved professionals to 
enquire of family members regarding the donor status of those who 
have achieved, or are about to achieve, the definition of brain death.  
 
Routine enquiry has become legislation in eighteen states.  Indeed, the 
US Congress has made the implementation of routine enquiry policies a 
condition of payment under their health insurance schemes (Medicare 
and Medicaid), and the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organisations requires this as a condition of certification.26 
Thus, if routine enquiry policy is not followed, the health insurance 
schemes become invalid.  
 
Required Request  - Required request involves hospitals asking each 
person they admit about their donor status. The procedure of required 
request is very active in the US. The development of required request 
policies by hospitals was encouraged by the Omnibus (Budget) 
Reconciliation Act 1986. This Act provides that failure on the part of 
hospitals to adopt required request policies will lead to the denial of 
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements from the Health Care Finance 
Authority, as is the case for routine enquiry.27  Twenty six US states 
have this type of policy.  It has even been suggested that the institutions 
make this request in outpatients clinics, emergency rooms, etc., and that 
doctors make the request in their offices.  
 
In the UK required request was considered in the late eighties by the 
Department of Health and Social Security, but was rejected in favour of 
a policy involving better information concerning donation and an 
extension of the donor card system. Nevertheless, it could be argued 
that required request might be one way of closing the gap between 
voluntary donors and patients requiring organs. One estimate in the US 
suggests that whilst 200,000 persons are declared brain dead each year, 
organs are only harvested from 2,000, whilst the combined need for 
hearts, lungs, and kidneys, is estimated at 50,000 or more.28  In the UK 
there are an estimated 2,300 cases where brainstem criteria determine 
death, which could alleviate some of the pressure from the waiting 
transplant lists.29  
                                                          
26 New et al, ‘A question of give and take’.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Schwartz, ‘Bioethical and legal considerations in increasing the supply of 
transplntable organs’. 
29 S.M. Gore, D.J. Cable, and A.J. Holland, ‘Organ donation from intensive care units in 
England and Wales: two year confidential audit of deaths in intensive care, BMJ, 304, 
(1992), pp.349-355. 
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While there was an initial increase over time in the number of procured 
organs, neither routine enquiry nor required request appear to have had 
a major impact.30 One reason for this, it is suggested, is the lack of 
institutional commitment to ensuring that the required request 
procedures are followed.31 The US experience illustrates that simply to 
enact required request legislation is not enough. It is vital to have 
adequately trained and qualified personnel.32  
 
Routine enquiry and required request may not be working because the 
real problem in organ procurement is not legal but psychological.33 
Medical professionals worry about their legal liability in the organ 
procurement process; they also find organ procurement time consuming 
and emotionally demanding.34 Some commentators advocate better 
professional education to help implement the policy.35 Others suggest a 
policy of 'routine referral' that would require hospitals to report 
potential donors at the time of admission to the ICU.36  
 
Upon review, it seems that all of the systems of organ procurement are 
at present unsatisfactory. Xenotransplantation is a contentious issue 
which raises serious ethical and moral concerns. The British Advisory 
Group on the ethics of xenotransplantation has made recommendations 
for a National Working Party on Xenotransplantation.37  There is no 
doubt that if appropriate measures were taken the supply of organs 
through the existing programme could be markedly increased. Routine 
salvaging, with presumed consent, might risk overriding an individual's 
deeply felt objection to post-mortem donation, whilst the operation of a 
veto by relatives may frustrate a genuine desire to become a donor. In 
fact none of the systems in practice today can guarantee that an 
individual's wishes will be respected. The wishes of the donor card 
holder may be frustrated because no one looked for the card, or the 
family concealed the fact that one was held. A system of presumed 
                                                          
30 New et al, ‘A question of give and take’. 
31 McDonald, ‘Organ donation, new issues, new controversies’. 
32 Randhawa, ‘Improving the supply of organ donors in the UK’. 
33 G.J. Annas, ‘The paradoxes of organ transplantation’, American Journal of Public 
Health, 78, (1988), pp.621-622.  
34 J. Prottas and H.L. Batten, ‘Health professionals and hospital administrators in organ 
procurement, reservations, and their resolutions’, American Journal of Public Health, 78, 
(1988), pp.642-645. 
35 A.L. Caplan, ‘Professional arrogance and public misunderstanding’, Hastings Center 
Report, (April/May, 1988), pp.34-37.  
36 J. Prottas, ‘Shifting responsibilities in organ procurement: a plan for routine referral’, 
JAMA, 260, (1988), pp.832-833. 
37 The Advisory Group on the Ethics of Xenotransplantation, ‘Animal tissue into 
humans’. 
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consent might go into operation before it is known that the individual 
did not wish to donate. Elective ventilation and the use of non-heart 
beating donors are fraught with ethical dilemmas. Additionally, any 
major shift in policy would require new laws and regulations to be 
enacted and accepted by politicians and the general public. This, of 
course, would involve implementing an effective information campaign 
which would come across major difficulties as with the previous donor 
card campaigns. 
 
If the voluntary system is to be maintained, measures need to be taken 
to attract more voluntary donors. Proposals now in force in the UK 
include provisions for individuals to express consent to organ donation 
on their driving licence, or to register as a donor when they apply for a 
new licence. There is also a need for better information about the 
mechanics of brainstem death in nursing and medical courses. 
 
There is a need too  for further investigation into reasons why potential 
organ sources are not adequately used. Intensive care units are potential 
sources but many patients who might be donors do not get into the 
units. Some doctors prefer to care for some dying on the wards and do 
not want them started on positive pressure ventilation. This is 
legitimate, and therapy should not be directed with extrinsic interests in 
mind; however, it gives rise to the problem that patients not on 
ventilators cannot be suitable donors. 
 
It is argued that the most important factor is the difficulty some doctors 
feel in approaching relatives whose only interest (as is theirs) is in the 
survival of the potential donor.38 There is no doubt that the most 
important determinant of the frequency of organ donation is the 
willingness of medical and nursing staff caring for potential donors to 
initiate this process and to undertake the considerable extra work that 
this entails.39  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
At present, public policy relies upon voluntarism with any attempt to 
shift from this being rebuffed in previous years. The British NHS Organ 
                                                          
38 C. Clark and G. Whitfield, ‘Deaths from chronic renal failure, BMJ, 283, (1981), 
pp.283-287.  
39 B.Jennet and C. Hesset, ‘Brain deaths in Britain as reflected in renal donors’, BMJ, 
283, (1981), pp.359-362. 
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Donor Register has been set up consisting of names of donors who have 
given express consent. Every Transplant Co-ordinator has instant access 
to this register. To avoid incorrect readings on the register and to allow 
opportunity to revoke a decision, individuals should be regularly 
contacted, by letter, to reaffirm (or reconsider) their status.  
 
If the donor register proves to be successful, one would see a marked 
reduction of transplant waiting lists. For those patients requiring a 
kidney transplant, a reduction in the number of patients on dialysis 
would also occur. This in the long run would be very cost-effective 
saving millions of pounds each year as the cost of a transplant is cheaper 
than maintaining a patient on a dialysis machine. As a general rule the 
cost of a successful transplant plus one year of post-operative therapy 
amounts to less than the cost of one year of the cheapest form of chronic 
dialysis. After the first year of post-operative therapy, the costs are 
negligible.40  
 
Xenotransplantation in Britain should not go ahead until the existing 
organ procurement programme is reviewed and the possibility of 
introducing other human organ procurement programmes which are 
used currently in some other countries explored. Has our society not 
reached a point of sophistication where we should be aiming to cease 
using animals altogether? There should be increased liaison between 
transplant communities throughout the world to discuss the experiences 
of various procurement programmes. Previous attempts to change 
legislation may have failed but with the prospect of 
xenotransplantation, there may well be a 'change of heart'. 
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Review Essay 
 
Winston, Mark L. Nature Wars: People vs. Pests, x + 210pp.  Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1997.  
 
he issue of dealing with pests (particularly insects) that either 
threaten or attack human interests involves several levels of 
debate. The proposal put forward by Mark Winston in People 
versus Pests  approaches the issue in terms of the means by which 
pests are controlled, the aims of pest control and what constitutes harm 
caused by pests. This approach raises more important ethical and 
philosophical issues, which have been discussed by both Draney1  and 
Michael2 (in their works on environmental ethics. Both of these works 
assist in critical evaluation of Winston’s proposals. Issues that arise from 
Winston’s ethic are human obligations to the ecosystem and living 
things, as well as what constitutes need, and harm. These issues are then 
considered in terms of the conflict between human’s needs and interests, 
and the needs and interests of both insects and the environment. In 
order to give due consideration to all the relevant arguments that 
surround Winston’s proposals, this review will begin with a discussion 
of Winston’s argument. This will be followed by consideration of the 
arguments of Draney and Michael. Once these arguments have been 
examined, it will be possible to analyse Winston’s proposals in depth. 
Each one of his proposals will be considered in turn, with attention 
being given to the moral issues and debates that surround the topic.  
This discussion will allow for the necessary evaluation of his ethics and 
proposals to take place. 
 
Mark Winston’s3 pest management ethic follows three basic principles: 
Firstly, chemical pesticides should be the last course of action taken, not 
the first. Secondly, the aim of pest control should be management, not 
eradication. Thirdly, only pests who cause a significant amount of 
damage should be targeted.  Winston argues that chemical pesticides 
pollute the environment and have negative health consequences for 
humans. However these are not the only problems caused by chemical 
pesticides according to Winston. He argues that the use of chemicals 
indicates an aim of eradicating pests and controlling nature.  
                                                          
1 M. Draney, ‘Ethical obligations toward insect pests’, Ethics and the Environment, 2/1, 
(1997).  
2 M. Michael, ‘To swat or not to swat:pesky flies, environmental ethics, and the 
supererogatory’, Environmental Ethics, 18/2, (1996).  
3 Winston, ‘Nature Wars’, p.176. 
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Furthermore, he argues that the damage caused by pests is largely 
cosmetic and has little effect on the quality and quantity of the produce. 
Putting this proposal into practice requires the use of alternative 
technology. Winston recommends biological means, which are safe and 
non-toxic. It also requires a shift in cultural perceptions; society should 
be less concerned with dominating nature and the outward aesthetics of 
produce. To a large extent, Winston's argument is utilitarian, in the way 
it aims to work with, and reduce damage to the environment. At the 
same time, it aims to meet human needs to the greatest extent possible.  
The means that Winston puts forward to meet his aims are not the only 
ones available. Other theorists have taken up these arguments with 
different perspectives and logic. These arguments have focused on the 
environmental ethics that follow from both the means and ends put 
forward by Winston. 
 
Michael Draney’s article4 introduces different ways to view the problem 
of pest management. Draney looks at what is defined by the term ‘pest’. 
He argues that the term is somewhat misguided and anthropocentric, as 
an insect serving an ecological function in a natural environment does 
not in any way clash with human interests. It is only when such an 
insect interferes with human interests in a man-made environment that 
it is termed a ‘pest’.  Draney at this point considers it important to 
examine the harm that the insect causes – for example, does it spread 
disease?, or is its harm merely aesthetic? – so that a true understanding 
of its value or pest status may be reached. 
 
Draney’s argument extends further than examining harms and 
definitions. Draney argues that there is a moral difference between 
insect pests in terms of whether they are being dealt with on the level of 
individual, population or species. The particular level will have 
corresponding ramifications for the ecosystem.  For instance, Draney 
argues that to eradicate an entire species is morally wrong, because that 
may have dire environmental and evolutionary consequences. Whereas 
it would not be wrong to kill an individual pest, as this will not bring 
severe consequences.  The distinction of levels that Draney puts forward 
is very important, as each level brings with it different ethical concerns 
and environmental obligations. These concerns and obligations have 
moral relevance where the means of pest control are employed.  With 
this in mind the work and ideas of Draney greatly assist in a critique of 
Winston’s proposals. 
 
                                                          
4 Draney, ‘Ethical obligations toward insect pests’. 
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Michael5 introduces the idea of biocentrism as a basis for making moral 
decisions regarding insect pests. This is an idea which was not 
advocated by either Winston or Draney. Biocentrism may be defined as 
the idea that all living things have value, and that it is wrong to deprive 
a living thing of its life. The problem with this idea is that following it 
exactly does not allow for any effective response to dealing with insect 
pests. Michael notes that some theorists seek to find a way around this 
by implementing a hierarchy of interests where conflict occurs between 
human and insect pests. The problem with this according to Michael, is 
that it defeats that most basic notion of biocentrism, which is that life 
must be preserved. Thus a dilemma emerges. 
 
Michael argues that it is possible to remain biocentric and overcome this 
hurdle at the same time. This can be done by employing the 
supererogatory. The supererogatory may be defined as a process of 
going beyond the requirements of duty or obligation. This process 
involves assessing the relevant interests and potential harms of an 
action, in this case, killing a pest. Then the action which has the more 
basic interest and causes the least harm is chosen. Thus, this process of 
assessment allows the biocentrist to go beyond the requirements of 
duty. Michael’s argument brings a different approach to evaluating the 
proposals put forward by Winston. Michael is not so much concerned 
with the means of killing but the morality of killing. Michael’s work is of 
particular value in its analysis of means to overcome moral dilemmas 
where conflicts of interests emerge. 
 
To begin the discussion and evaluation of Winston’s first proposal, it 
would be worthwhile to consider how avoiding the use of chemical 
pesticides is advantageous and ethical. Winston argues that chemical 
pesticides can pollute the air and soil, making farmland useless over an 
extended period of time. It is also argued by Winston that chemical 
pesticides have the ability to cause a range of ailments in humans, 
including cancer.  Biological methods of pest control may include 
introducing natural enemies or diseases to the pest population, or 
altering reproductive patterns. These strategies do not pollute the 
atmosphere or environment and do not affect humans. Winston is thus 
arguing that avoiding chemical pesticides is the most moral course of 
action because it places the long-term needs of both humans and the 
environment ahead of short-term goals of profit. 
 
There are, however, problems in the use of biologically-based means to 
pest control. On a practical level, there are issues concerning their 
                                                          
5 Michael, ‘To swat or not to swat’. 
 
 
 66 
expense and applicability. The expense of biological methods falls more 
on to the producer than the consumer. That is because these methods 
can be expensive to research.Where they are employed, however, they 
may not need to be re-employed as they offer a permanent solution (as 
would be the case if the pest population were prevented from 
reproducing). These methods do not provide the profit incentive which 
is available to the producers of chemical products, who are able to have 
the demand for the products maintained.  Chemical pesticides are 
simpler and more affordable. Nor do they require the same degree of 
research, complexity or expense. Winston notes that simplicity and 
expense are highly important to farmers in their selection of a pest 
control regime. 
 
Problems with biological means of pest control are not just in the 
practical domain; there are also ethical concerns to attend to. Winston 
argues that biological methods are more environmentally friendly than 
chemical alternatives, however, this argument does not hold true for 
Draney. This is because biological means do not only attack individual 
insects but the population or even the species. Winston may respond to 
this by arguing that the insect is only attacked at the level of population 
where it is a problem. Draney would still consider biological methods a 
problem with that being granted, because there is a flow-on effect 
between individuals, population and species. Thus, if a disease or 
predator was introduced to control an insect pest population in one 
particular area, it is possible that the disease or predator could spread 
and eliminate the entire species. Thus, maintaining bio-diversity as a 
serious concern in environmental ethics, means that biological methods 
of insect pest control may not always be the most appropriate course of 
action. 
 
Winston’s argument to avoid the use of chemical pesticides stands on 
the grounds that biologically based alternatives are safer for both 
consumers and the environment. Thus, it is argued that their benefit is 
twofold in that they protect consumers and the environment, while 
addressing the basic interests of sustained food supply. However, it 
must be made clear that the criticisms made by Draney do carry 
significant weight. That is because the potential damages that a 
biological means of control could cause to the environment and 
ecosystem is unclear. Thus, it involves an element risk. For instance, 
introducing a natural predator to attack a pest may see that predator 
become a pest when their intended role is complete. Thus the issues 
raised by Draney question Winston’s first principle by showing that 
biological strategies are not without their problems. 
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The work done by Michael has not received much attention in the 
analysis of this first proposal. That is because Michael’s work focuses 
more on harms and needs rather than the means.  However, his work 
does offer some guidance, in that selection of a pest control strategy 
should be that which meets basic human needs while causing the least 
possible harm. The only way to ensure that the least harmful means is 
employed is to base that decision on true empirical research and ethical 
guidelines which support human and environmental interests. 
 
Winston’s second proposal is that pest control should aim to manage, 
rather than eradicate pests. In order to understand why management is 
a more appropriate strategy than eradication, it would be useful to 
discuss those ethical problems which arise from eradication strategies. 
Draney quotes two entomologists from the 1950s at the beginning of his 
article to show that eradication strategies were taught and taken 
seriously in the past.  It is possible that they are still held in high regard 
by some. 
 
The first ethical problem with eradication is that it can be argued that it 
is not justified to kill insects which do not threaten basic human 
interests. This argument may be countered by the claim that only 
destructive insects are targeted. However, a strategy which aims to 
eliminate an entire population will most likely claim other (non-
threatening) living things through the methods used. 
 
Another, and perhaps more serious ethical problem concerns human 
obligations to the environment. There are two major issues of concern in 
this problem. The first, which is taken up by Winston is that eradication 
would employ extreme measures over a sustained period, leading to 
environmental degradation.  The next issue of concern relates to 
evolution and biodiversity.  This concern is taken up and argued by 
Draney. It follows from the premise that for evolution to continue, 
biodiversity must be maintained. Biodiversity allows ecosystems to 
function in completeness and for potential benefits from the offending 
organism to be discovered. 
 
Thus, if a process of eradication is employed over the long term, the 
physical environment, ecosystems, and biodiversity would all be 
depleted to a point where humans would be unable to use necessary 
natural resources.6 
 
                                                          
6 Draney, ‘Ethical obligations toward insect pests’; Winston, ‘Nature Wars’.  
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 Clearly aiming to eradicate pests leads to the conclusion that 
management of the pest issue is a more ethical approach.  However, 
before this conclusion is made, it is imperative to examine what is meant 
by management. In the context of this review, management may be 
taken to mean working with natural forces, rather than against them.  
Although this principle may be widely endorsed, how it is applied may 
be vastly different. For instance, biologically-based pest control would 
constitute good management for Winston, but it would amount to an 
ecological threat for Draney. Michael would argue that maintaining 
respect for biocentrism is imperative, and where conflicts arise, a 
decision should be based on the most basic needs and least harm. 
 
Thus, what is meant by management is to a large degree subjective. 
However, what is clearly understood is that management involves a 
process of assessment in which needs, harms and competing interests 
are evaluated. They are evaluated in terms of maintaining the 
environment in the best condition possible, whilst avoiding major and 
unnecessary harms. This management ethic takes into consideration that 
the natural environment can never be completely under the control of 
humans. Whereas, attaining total control of the insect world (or nature) 
is a subversive motive in eradication strategy.7 Thus, the management 
ethic indicates a more careful process of ethical assessment while taking 
environmental laws into consideration.  Arguably, this second proposal 
of Winston’s is quite valid. 
 
Winston’s third pest management principle is ‘only pests doing 
substantial damage should be managed, and only when their damage 
approaches an economically significant threshold’.8  Perhaps this criteria 
may simply be viewed as quality and quantity. That is to say that 
substantial damage may refer to the quality of the produce. Whilst 
‘economically significant’ can refer to the ability to grow produce in 
significant enough quantities to ensure supply and profitability. It is 
worthwhile qualifying this point, because Winston argues that much of 
the damage caused by pests is purely cosmetic, and does not affect the 
nutritional value or yield of the produce. For instance, if a vegetable has 
insects on it that do not damage its quality, these insects could simply be 
washed off prior to preparation without resorting to the use of 
pesticides. 
 
Essentially, Winston is arguing that only pests, which threaten the 
ability of farmers to grow produce, should be targeted.  Winston asserts 
                                                          
7 Winston, ‘Nature Wars’. 
8 Winston, ‘Nature Wars’, p.176. 
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that it is public perception that demands blemish free food, and so 
public perception needs to be more informed, in order for it to be 
understood that ‘blemished produce’, does not mean inedible produce. 
Thus, in order to implement Winston’s third principle, public attitudes 
and values will need to be changed through a means of mass education. 
This creates somewhat of a dilemma. If edible but blemished produce 
were available in the marketplace, it would be very difficult to sell; the 
consequences of which would be economic damage incurred by the 
producer. Thus a pest which damages only the cosmetic appearances of 
produce may be doing economically significant damage. An assessment 
of what constitutes damage may assist in the resolution of this dilemma. 
 
Is it possible to have blemish free produce and still follow an ethically 
justified pest management regime?  In order to answer this question, the 
arguments of both Draney and Michael can be employed. It is helpful to 
consider basic and non-basic needs.  Food supply is a basic need. 
Whereas blemish-free food is a non-basic need, so it may be morally 
justified to have environmentally friendly pest control, which 
consequently causes blemished produce. Winston argues that reduced 
and specifically targeted pest control will deliver this outcome. 
However, Draney argues that the methods Winston promotes would be 
environmentally damaging. For Draney it is not essential to draw a line 
to minimise pest control on the basis of needs, rather pest control is 
acceptable so long as environmental concerns (most notably, 
biodiversity) are upheld. Thus, assuming the means of pest control are 
environmentally sound, it would be morally justified to target pests 
which affect the appearance of food and subsequently livelihoods. 
However, if one were to support the biocentric position described by 
Michael then it would not be justified to kill insects for aesthetic reasons, 
as this argument only allows for killing of pests where basic needs are in 
conflict. 
 
Perhaps the best way out of this quagmire is to borrow ethical principles 
from both Winston and Draney. Firstly, empirical evidence is needed on 
what (if any) damage to the environment a pest control regime will 
cause. If all regimes cause damage then it would not only be justified 
but necessary to limit pest control to where it is needed most. However, 
if there was a pest control regime that allowed for biodiversity to be 
maintained and did not poison humans, soil or food, then it would be 
justified to use that regime to whatever extent necessary. There would, 
however, be biocentric objections on this premise. However, these 
would inevitably be overlooked by the economics of producing and 
selling food.  It may be argued that no pest management regime can be 
 
 
 70 
totally friendly to the environment. However, it would appear from 
Winston’s work that research is continuing with that aim in mind. 
 
Mark Winston’s proposal that chemical pesticides should be the last 
method employed, not the first, has environmental concerns at its core. 
However, this principle is imperfect. That is because putting chemical 
methods last, means something else must come first. Winston argues 
that biological means should be given priority. He considers them to be 
safe, permanent and non toxic.  However, Draney makes a very valid 
ethical criticism against giving biological means priority. This is, that 
biological means can attack pests at the level of species, which may lead 
to extinction.  This is a very serious problem as biodiversity is justifiably 
a central principle in environmental ethics. Thus, a resolution may lie in 
finding what is the least harmful means of pest control in terms of 
sustaining the environment and biodiversity. 
 
Winston’s second proposal is totally justified. Firstly, because 
eradication is coming from the standpoint of trying to control natural 
forces, which is impossible but also because eradication strategies do not 
consider any moral obligation to insects or the environment. Thus, no 
line of ethical argument would support eradication. However, theorists 
would differ over what constitutes good management. 
 
Finally, Winston’s third proposal aims to target pest control only where 
it is essential. This aim is justified in that it seeks to minimise 
environmental damage caused by pest control.  However, there are 
problems with this proposal. Firstly, what classifies as ‘essential’ would 
be interpreted differently by consumers, farmers and authorities. 
Secondly, if our moral obligations to pests are only that their species are 
maintained within the ecosystem (as Draney argues), then it would be 
justified to target pest control in non-essential areas, so long as it did not 
damage the environment or ecosystem. However, this argument may be 
putting human interests first. As a biocentrist argues, it is unjustified to 
kill insects for non-basic needs, however this line of argument is highly 
impractical. It is more realistic to consider our moral obligations to 
insects not in terms of rights but as part of our obligations to the 
environment.  Thus, Winston’s final proposal is justified where pest 
control is environmentally destructive. 
 
 
Andrew Asquith 
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Book Reviews 
 
 
Dol, Marcel, Kasanmoentalib, Soemini, Lijmbach, Susanne, Rivas, Esterban, 
van den Bos, Ruud, editors, Animal Consciousness and Animal Ethics: 
Perspectives from the Netherlands, xii + 249pp., Van Gorcum, Assen, 1997.  
 
 
Animal Consciousness and Animal Ethics is a broad ranging collection of 
papers mainly from Dutch writers on the issue of animal consciousness 
and animal ethics. The prologue, written by Richard Burkhardt is on the 
founders of ethology and where they stood on the issue of animal 
subjectivity. The focus is on Tinbergen who expressed doubts about the 
possibility of an experimentally based study of this subjectivity, in 
contrast to Julian Huxley who favoured psychological explanations over 
physiological ones. Huxley experienced no difficulty in talking about 
the minds of animals.  
 
Wim van der Steen tackles the concept of consciousness arguing that in 
fact there are many concepts here, depending on context. He contents 
that when trying to pin down the particular meaning it will be necessary 
to appeal to common sense, not just biology. While I can accept that it 
may be necessary to include mentalistic ideas in conceptions of 
consciousness, it is not necessary to equate those with ‘commonsense’, a 
very vague and variable notion. Consider for instance the commonsense 
view of witches in the sixteenth century. The need to go beyond biology 
is well-argued by van der Steen not only for ethology but for psychiatry, 
neuropsychology and psychoneuroimmunology. This discussion makes 
some fascinating links in the critique of these four disciplines. 
 
JanVorstenbosch states that it ‘is not possible to reach water-tight 
conclusions on whether animal consciousness exists on the basis of 
empirical evidence concerning animals’ but he does not lead into this 
from an examination of the empirical evidence. Instead he stresses the 
lingering importance of Descartes’ position. He makes many appeals to 
‘the scientific canon’, yet this is a conception of science which has been 
strongly criticized in the last few decades. Vorstenbosch’s more positive 
contribution is in the use of ‘belief-policies’ which give a basis for 
accepting a belief where there is no conclusive evidence. Moral 
considerations may enter here.  
 
Monica Meijsing works on problems in defining consciousness rejecting 
notions linking consciousness with language (Dennitt, Rosenthal, 
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Searle). Her own account makes interesting use of certain ideas about 
perception linking it to self- awareness.  Susanne Lijmbach draws on 
phenomenology to argue that there is a discontinuity between the 
animal and human experiential ability leading to an idea of animal pre-
consciousness which differs from human consciousness. 
 
Francoise Wemelsfelder takes on the intriguing position that it is not 
impossible to investigate an animal’s point of view. In particular she 
asks, ‘What is it like for an animal to spend its life in closely and 
chronically confined conditions?’ She accepts that animals are capable of 
subjective, sentient experience but she does not seek identification with 
an animal’s experience ‘from within’. Nevertheless observation and 
understanding of this experience is still possible. Mechanistic accounts 
of experience and behaviour are rejected. For Wemelsfelder it is the 
expressive nature of behaviour which gives access to subjectivity 
whether in humans or other animals. Much attention is given to how 
this approach can be conceived of as scientific, and new scientific 
directions for research are proposed.  
 
The articles in Part II take up various scientific issues related to animal 
consciousness, e.g. the common strategies for maintaining homeostasis 
in vertebrates; emotional behaviour in pigs; suffering and well-being 
across different species; the usefulness of control theory and cybernetics 
to study the experiences of animals or humans empirically. 
 
The third part focuses on ethical issues and contains papers by two 
contributors to this edition of Animal Issues: Frans Brom and Henk 
Verhoog. Brom extends the discussion of animal welfare beyond 
questions of suffering into the capacities that an animal has to live a 
certain life. Verhoog (together with Thijs Visser) explores the idea of 
intrinsic value not based on animal consciousness. It is rewarding to 
read both these articles in conjunction with the two in this journal both 
of which take up more applied philosophical issues.  
 
Other contributions to Part III engage with: problems in conventional 
theories of animal ethics (Estoban Rivas); a fascinating view of animal 
consciousness and ethics drawing on Lacan, Plessner and Levinas and 
describing Kant’s position as ‘a masterly move to exclude animal-
protection for centuries from the agenda of ethics and law’ (Tjard de 
Cock Buning); the idea about what matters to an animal and how that 
relates to ethics (F. Jan Grommers) and Rob de Vries gives a summary of 
Dutch research on animal consciousness and ethics. 
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This is an incredibly rich volume exploring many diverse directions and 
offering very fruitful ground for further research and reflection.  
 
Denise Russell 
 
 
Vikka, Leena, The Intrinsic Value of Nature,  xii + 168pp., Rodopi, 
Amsterdam, Atlanta, 1997.  
 
In The Intrinsic Value of Nature,  Leena Vikka’s approach to the subject of 
the relationship between humans and the non-human world is informed 
by both theory and practical experience. Apart from being a researcher 
at the Academy of Finland and university lecturer in Environmental 
Ethics, Vikka is active in affairs concerning the environment. She is 
chairperson of two Finnish organisations; the Wolf Group and Green 
Union for the Protection of Life.  
 
The Intrinsic Value of Nature is a work which attempts to redress 
disparities within ethical theories and/or attitudes of contemporary 
humans regarding their relationship to other animals and to the natural 
world. In Vikka’s opinion, the majority of philosophers and scientists 
are reluctant to apply ‘the language of intrinsic value in the non-human 
world’. (p.3) Theories of value are underpinned by two questionable 
assumptions, namely: 1) human beings, of all living forms, are the only 
beings to have intrinsic value and 2) the source of all values is the 
human being.  
 
Vikka proposes that nature itself has intrinsic value and that an ethical 
theory of the intrinsic value of nature could promote an attitude of 
respect for all forms of life, including the human (and other animals) 
and nature. Vikka’s objective, ‘the well-being of the people on Earth and 
the well-being of the Earth and its diverse life forms, plants and 
animals’ (p.3) reflects the extent of her concern for the need of a more 
equitable system of values.  
 
Following her analysis of the philosophy of nature-conservation in the 
light of the intrinsic value of nature, Vikka claims that a naturalistic, or 
naturocentric theory of value - one based on ethical extensionism and 
pluralism would alter the traditional anthropocentric perspective of the 
concepts of values and ‘rights’. Vikka believes that if a naturocentric,  
rather than an anthropocentric theory of values is embraced, it will 
allow recognition of the fact that several kinds of intrinsic value exist. 
Furthermore, in view of the possibility of ‘non-human entities’ being 
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regarded as possessing intrinsic value, the term ‘rights’ could be 
reassessed to encompass the ‘intrinsic rights of animals, of trees and 
plants, and even of mountains, and other ecosystems’. (p.119)  
 
According to Vikka the ‘value of life requires the right to live and 
flourish in each life-form’ (p.120) but the intrinsic value of the ecosystem 
itself can only be realised (and is indeed necessitated) by the cessation of 
human activities which pollute the environment. 
 
Elizabeth Steinmetz 
 
 
Sylwan, Peter et al, Transgenic animals - why?,  82 pp., Nordic Council of 
Ministers, Copenhagen, 1998. 
 
Transgenic animals - why? is a publication from the Nordic Committee on 
Bioethics set up in 1989 to encourage collaboration on bioethical issues. 
Several of the papers deal with the science behind the development of 
transgenic animals. One chapter deals with commercial issues and one 
with legal matters. Four chapters focus on ethical issues and these will 
be highlighted here.  
 
Peter Sylwan argues that the basic ethical questions raised by the 
development of transgenic animals exist in relation to gene 
manipulation through conventional breeding. He stresses that the latter 
has often been promoted simply ‘for the excitement and joy of humans’. 
He extols the benefits of transgenics in furthering knowledge about the 
mechanisms of life and in providing valuable assistance to the Human 
Genome Project. He predicts that this area of science will vastly increase 
the need for research animals. Human ethical issues concerning risk in 
the creation of viruses or dangerous DNA sequences are acknowledged. 
No ethical concern for the transgenic animals is mentioned.  
 
Svein Aage Christoffersen looks at the phrase ‘man is playing God’ that 
is often applied to genetic engineering and suggests different 
interpretations. He is concerned about unintended consequences of such 
engineering and urges caution. Christoffersen also takes up issues of 
animal ethics claiming that there are some limits to the human use (or 
abuse) of animals. He states that ‘animals may be used for human 
benefit only when the result is of considerable importance to man’, and 
then considers that requirement in the creation of transgenic farm 
animals. He does not believe that the goals here are significant enough 
to over-ride the pain and suffering of animals.  
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Christoffersen also presents an interesting account of why the creation 
of transgenic animals does lead us into different ethical issues from 
traditional breeding and he gives an unusual twist to the notion of 
‘playing God’ interpreting it as ‘to care’. 
 
Birgitta Forsman begins with an outline of the main uses of transgenic 
animals. Then she considers issues of human and animal welfare 
arguing that although there may be some human benefits, there are 
possible dangers or disadvantages for humans. Forsman then canvasses 
some contemporary approaches to animal ethics, pointing out their 
limitations. There is some specific discussion of the oncomouse. In 
general, Forsman says that there can be no ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response to the 
development of transgenic animals rather we need to consider the 
interests of animals as well as human welfare. She supports the view 
that ‘All interests should be considered equally’ but she does not take 
that to mean that every being possessing interests has an equal moral 
status.  
 
Ritta Salmi defends a notion of animal rights and in particular she 
claims that animal welfare legislation implies that animals have a right 
not to be caused to suffer by humans. Such legislation implies that 
animals are not just our property or tools. Yet as Salmi points out, there 
is a huge inconsistency in the legislation. While acknowledging that 
animals have a right to live free from human-inflicted pain it allows that 
animals may be caused severe pain in some circumstances e.g. in 
intensive food production or experimental research. Salmi queries 
whether the causing of pain to animals can be justified for any other 
purpose than the benefit to the animal itself.  
 
Salmi resists the move to equate genetic modification with traditional 
breeding and argues that the former gives rise to many causes of 
concern, quite of few of which are detailed.  
 
In the last three articles different views are expressed on the intrinsic 
value of animals, the importance of species integrity and the likely 
medical benefits of transgenetic research. (They agree that the use of 
transgenic animals as farm animals is highly problematic.) However 
taken together they give a useful base for thinking about a diversity of 
ethical problems raised by the development of transgenic animals. 
 
Denise Russell    
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Book Notes 
 
Taylor, Victoria J. and Dunstone, Nigel, editors, The Exploitation of 
Mammal Populations, xx + 415, Chapman & Hall, London, 1996.  
 
This is a depressing yet important book outlining the myriad of way 
mammals are exploited or ‘sustainably used’. It covers the fur trade, 
whaling, hunting for food or sport and ecotourism as well as other 
topics. General issues of a historical and conceptual nature are explored. 
There are 22 authors mainly from Britain. The chapters were originally 
papers at a conference jointly organized by the Universities’ Federation 
for Animal Welfare and the Mammal Society. 
 
Donovan, Josephine and Adams, Carol J.  editors, Beyond Animal 
Rights: A feminist caring ethic for the treatment of animals, 216pp, 
Continuum, New York, 1996. 
 
Beyond Animal Rights contains a collection of articles pointing out the 
limitations of an animal ethics which depends on a rights-based 
framework. The idea of an ethics of care which Carol Gilligan elaborated 
in the book, In a Different Voice in relation to humans only, is taken up 
here to work out how we can ground animal ethics appealing to an 
ethics of care. The individual contributors are Marti Kheel, Josephine 
Donovan, Deane Curtin, Brian Luke, Rita C. Manning, Kenneth Shapiro 
and Carol, J. Adams. A useful biography on these issues is included.   
 
McElroy, Susan Chernak, Animals as Teachers and Healers, xviii + 252pp, 
Rider, London, 1996. 
 
Animals as Teachers and Healers unashamedly reflects Susan Chernak 
McElroy’s love of animals. This comes out in her accounts of the 
companionship of dogs and the remarkable powers of cats and dolphins 
to help sick humans. She discusses animals as guardians and guides and 
interactions with wild animals. Most of the accounts are personal stories 
and it is the personal relationship with particular animals which 
grounds an implicit ethics of respect for other species.  
 
Masson, Jeffrey Moussaieff, Dogs Never Lie About Love: Reflections on the 
Emotional World of Dogs , 240pp., Jonathan Cape, London, 1997. 
 
The main theme of Dogs Never Lie About Love  is that the reason why 
humans and dogs have such an intense relationship is that there is a 
mutual ability to understand one another’s emotional responses. 
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Masson illustrates this with numerous anecdotes and reports of 
emotions in dogs including forgiveness, friendliness, love (or even 
‘hyperlove’), joy, loyalty, gratitude, loneliness, compassion, dignity, 
humiliation and disappointment, sadness and abandonment. This 
shows fairly convincingly humans’ ability to understand dogs but we 
are not told how or even whether dogs understand human emotional 
responses. Given that we can lie about love this perhaps destroys the 
mutuality of Masson’s thesis.  
 
The book contains some wonderful stories about dogs, written in a 
dashing style and is quite informative on dog behaviour. There is also a 
chapter on dogs’ sense of smell, their relations of dominance and 
submission, a perceptive discussion of dogs at play, and the sameness 
and difference between dogs and wolves. There is a rather inconclusive 
chapter on aggression, and a short but informative discussion of the 
senses of dogs (in addition to smell). 
 
There is some rhetoric which could be taken as amusing or irritating, 
probably depending on the strength of one’s love of dogs: e.g. ‘Questers 
of the truth, that’s who dogs are; seekers after the invisible scent of 
another being’s authentic core’; ‘the dog is love’, ‘they [dogs] live in a 
whole world of feeling. One might even say a dog is feeling’ and ‘dogs 
are pure emotion’. 
 
Wynne-Tyson, Jon, Anything within reason,  191pp., Oakroyd Press, 
Hertfordshire, England, 1994.  
 
The battle between reason and emotion is played out in a wry literary 
exploration of the ethics of eating animals, people and plants. Anything 
within reason provokes new ways of thinking about many of these issues 
that would be difficult to present in theoretical argument precisely 
because the value of rationality is also challenged. There are touches of 
Virginia Woolf and George Orwell here.  
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